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In the mid-1990s, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (the “PSLRA”) and the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act (“SLUSA”), the most significant reforms of the laws 
governing private securities litigation and related class actions in six 
decades.  Congress intended these Acts to ensure that securities class 
actions would be litigated in federal court and subject to heightened federal 
standards.  Nevertheless, dozens of cases have held that actions brought on 
a class-wide basis that solely assert claims under the Securities Act of 1933 
can proceed in state court.  At the same time, dozens of other cases have 
conversely held that these cases can proceed only in federal court.  The 
dispute over these cases remains unresolved in the case law (in large part 
because there is generally no available appellate review of decisions by 
trial-level courts on this issue). 
The conflicting patch-quilt of decisions is the result of two recurring 
errors.  First, in resolving remand motions, many courts focus solely on 
whether a class action brought in state court can be removed to federal 
court under a specialized right of removal enacted by SLUSA.  This is the 
wrong question.  This Article contends that the right question is a threshold 
one:  whether state courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over class 
actions that assert Securities Act claims.  A provision of SLUSA — its 
“Jurisdictional Amendment,” Section 101(a)(3)(A) — provides that they do 
not.  A second recurring error is that courts misread SLUSA’s 
Jurisdictional Amendment and hold that state courts retain subject-matter 
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jurisdiction over class actions that assert Securities Act claims.  These 
courts fail to recognize that an assumption on which their interpretations 
rely has been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court.  Further, their 
interpretation is inconsistent with the legislative history and purpose of 
SLUSA and the precepts of federalism. 
As this Article discusses, SLUSA vests exclusive jurisdiction over 
class actions asserting Securities Act claims in the federal courts.  When 
class actions asserting such claims are brought in state court, they should be 
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or removed to federal 
court under the general removal statute in the Judicial Code, where they 
will be subject to the PSLRA’s reforms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-1990s, Congress enacted two sweeping amendments of the 
laws regarding private securities litigation:  the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”)1 and the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).2  The PSLRA was enacted in response 
to perceived abuses in securities litigation and instituted numerous 
reforms,3 but it had an “unintended consequence.”  The PSLRA prompted 
plaintiffs to shift from bringing securities class actions in federal court to 
bringing them in state court, which allowed them to evade many of the 
PSLRA’s reforms.4  Congress enacted SLUSA to stem the “shift[] from 
Federal to State courts” and to require that significant securities class 
actions be litigated in federal court, where they would be subject to the 
strictures of the PSLRA.5 
Since SLUSA was enacted, however, contentious recurring litigation 
has arisen and continues to arise about whether securities class actions may 
continue to proceed in state court and thereby evade the PSLRA.  In 
particular, litigants repeatedly contest whether “Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions” — class actions that allege only claims under the 
Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) with no pendent state law 
claims — can proceed in state court.  Courts uniformly agree that class 
actions brought in state court that allege both Securities Act claims and 
state law claims should proceed in federal court.  But, paradoxically, courts 
 
 1.  Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. 
 2.  Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227. 
 3.  See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006); 
see also infra Part I.B. 
 4.  See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82; see also infra Part I.B. 
 5.  See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. 105-353, § 2(2), (5), 112 
Stat. 3227, 3227; Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82; see also infra Parts I.B, V.  
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are deeply divided over whether Exclusively Federal Securities Class 
Actions that allege no state law claims may proceed in state court (where 
these class actions would not be subject to many of the requirements of and 
protections enacted by the PSLRA) or whether they may only proceed in 
federal court (where they would be subject to the PSLRA’s requirements).  
In the past decade and a half, over three dozen separate trial-level court 
decisions have been issued on this subject.  These decisions have come out 
with hopelessly conflicting answers, both in terms of their results and their 
reasoning.6  The ability to obtain appellate review of these decisions is near 
 
 6.  Compare Wunsch v. Am. Realty Capital Props., No. JFM-14-4007, 2015 WL 
2183035, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48759 (D. Md. Apr. 14, 2015), Lapin v. Facebook, Inc., 
Nos. C-12-3195 MMC et al., 2012 WL 3647409, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119924 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 23, 2012), Brady v. Kosmos Energy Ltd., Nos. 3:12-CV-0373-B, 3:12-cv-0781-B, 
2012 WL 6204247, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176567 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2012), 
Northumberland Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. GMX Res., Inc. 810 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (W.D. Okla. 
2011), Kramer v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig.), Nos. 08 Civ. 
7831(PAC), 09 Civ. 1352(PAC), 2009 WL 4067266, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109888 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2009), Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
Pinto v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-0062 (FLW), 2007 WL 1381746, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33287 (D.N.J. May 7, 2007), Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., Ltd., No. 06-CV-2964 (ERK), 
2007 WL 778485, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17671 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007), Rovner v. 
Holdings Vonage Corp., No. 07-178 (FLW), 2007 WL 446658, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8656 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007), Purowitz v. DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., No. CV 05-
6090 MRP (VBKx), 2005 WL 6794770, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46911 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 
2005), Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 3:05CV316-H, 2005 WL 2592229, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 44720 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005), In re King Pharm., Inc., 230 F.R.D. 503 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2004), Kulinski v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., No. C-2-03-412, 2003 WL 24032299, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26447 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2013) (report and recommendation), 
adopted, slip op. (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2004), ECF No. 31, Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 3:02-
2738-K, 3:02-CV-2379-K, 2003 WL 21056750, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900 (N.D. Tex. 
May 8, 2003), and Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
(holding, for varying and sometimes conflicting reasons, that Exclusively Federal Securities 
Class Actions should proceed only in federal courts), with Rosenberg v. Cliffs Natural Res., 
No. 1:14CV1531, 2015 WL 1534033, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48915 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 
2015), Plymouth Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Model N., Inc., No. 14-cv-04516-WHO, 2015 WL 
65110, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1104 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015), Rajasekaran v. CytRx Corp., 
No. CV 14-3406-GHK (PJWx), 2014 WL 4330787, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124550 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 21, 2014), Desmarais v. Johnson, Nos. C 13-03666 WHA et al., 2013 WL 
5735154, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153165 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2013), Toth v. Envivo, Inc., 
No. C 12-5636 CW, 2013 WL 5596965, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147569 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 
2013), City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. MetLife, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02626-HGD, 
2013 WL 5526621, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147675 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2013), Robinson v. 
Audience, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-232227, 2013 WL 2318459 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty. 
May 28, 2013), Reyes v. Zynga, Inc., No. C 12-05065 JSW, 2013 WL 5529754, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 146465 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2013), Niitsoo v. Alpha Natural Res., Inc., 902 F. 
Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. W. Va. 2012), Harper v. Smart Techs., Inc., No. 4:11-cv-05232-SBA, 
slip op. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012), ECF No. 42, Young v. Pac. Biosci. of Cal., Inc., No. 
5:11-cv-05668 EJD, 2012 WL 851509, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33695 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 
2012), W. Va. Laborers Trust Fund v. STEC, Inc., No. SACV 11-01171-JVS (MLGx), 2011 
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non-existent.7  Every year, plaintiffs bring new Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions in state court, and defendants attempt to shift such 
litigation to federal court.  Where these suits are adjudicated is generally 
unpredictable, and may depend on the district in which the case happens to 
be heard, or even the judge within the district that the parties happen to 
draw.  Today, seventeen years after SLUSA was enacted, courts are no 
closer to coming to a consensus about the treatment of Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions brought in state court.  To the contrary, the case 
law, defined by an ever-increasing number of non-binding trial-level court 
decisions, grows ever more disharmonious.8 
 
WL 6156945, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146846 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011), Luther v. 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011), W. Palm Beach 
Police Pension Fund v. Cardionet, Inc., No. 10cv711-L(NLS), 2011 WL 1099815, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30607 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011), Layne v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 
Nos. BC389208, BC389332, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Feb. 5, 2010), available at 
2010 WL 1637425, Parker v. Nat’l City Corp., No. 1:08 NC 70012, 2009 WL 9152972, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132947 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2009), Layne v. Countrywide Fin. 
Corp., No. CV 08-3262 MRP (MANx), 2008 WL 9476380, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123896 
(C.D. Cal. July 8, 2008), Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 1:06-CV-02391-JEC, 2007 WL 
2729011, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007), Bernd Bildstein IRRA v. 
Lazard Ltd., No. 05 CV 3388 RJDRML, 2006 WL 2375472, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61395 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006), Pipefitters Local 522 & 633 Pension Trust Fund v. Salem 
Commc’ns Corp., No. CV 05-2730-RGK (MCx), 2005 WL 6963459, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14202 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2005), Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., Nos. 04 C 
4909, 04 C 7906, 2005 WL 1272271, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12006 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 
2005), Zia v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2004), 
Steamfitters Local 449 Pension & Ret. Sec. Funds v. Quality Distribution, Inc., No. 8:04-cv-
961-T-26MAP, 2004 WL 6246913, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32014 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 
2004), In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.N.H. 2004), Williams v. AFC Enters., 
Inc., No. CIVA 103-CV-2490-TWT, 2003 WL 24100302, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28623 
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 20, 2003), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 389 F.3d 1185 (11th 
Cir. 2004), Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 
03CV0714BTM(JFS), 2003 WL 23509312, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15832 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 
27, 2003), Martin v. BellSouth Corp., No. 1:03-CV-728-WBH, 2003 WL 26476752, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28605 (N.D. Ga. July 3, 2003), Nauheim v. Interpublic Grp. of Cos., No. 
02-C-9211, 2003 WL 1888843, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003), and 
Miller v. Waste Mgmt., Inc. (In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig.), 194 F. Supp. 2d 590 
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding, for varying and sometimes conflicting reasons, that Exclusively 
Federal Securities Class Actions may proceed in state courts); see also infra Parts III, VI. 
 7.  See infra note 205. 
 8.  Commentators are no less split.  Compare Stephen O’Connor, Note, The Securities 
Act of 1933:  A Jurisdictional Puzzle, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1233 (2014), Mitchell A. 
Lowenthal & Timothy M. Haggerty, Jurisdictional Struggle Continues Over 1933 Act Class 
Suits, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 2010, at S4, Michael Serota, Student Short, (Mis)Interpreting 
SLUSA:  Closing the Jurisdictional Loophole in Federal Securities Class Actions, 7 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 162 (2010), Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Timothy M. Haggerty, Under 
SLUSA, State Courts Lack Jurisdiction to Hear Class Actions Asserting Claims Under the 
Securities Act, 39 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1003 (2007), William B. Snyder, Jr., 
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The question of whether Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions 
can proceed in state courts usually arises in the context of removal, i.e., 
where a plaintiff brings an Exclusively Federal Securities Class Action in 
state court and a defendant removes the action to federal court.  The 
plaintiff typically then files a motion to remand, and the federal court must 
determine whether removal was proper. 
The unresolved debate about the proper forum for Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions continues unabated because of two recurring 
errors.  The first error is that many courts simply assume that state courts 
have subject-matter jurisdiction over such actions and resolve remand 
motions simply by looking to SLUSA’s unique removal provisions.9  
SLUSA revised Section 16 of the Securities Act,10 which, in addition to 
making other changes, grants defendants a new right to remove certain 
class actions involving nationally traded securities, per Section 16(c).11  
When faced with a removal and a motion to remand, federal courts often 
focus single-mindedly on this new Section 16(c) and attempt to address 
whether the right of removal it provides covers Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions.12  But the propriety of removal is a secondary 
question; the threshold question is whether state courts have subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions in the first 
place.  If state courts lack such jurisdiction, SLUSA’s specialized removal 
provision is irrelevant — the class action can be removed under the Judicial 
Code’s removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1441.13 
As this Article explains, state courts are no longer courts of competent 
jurisdiction in class actions asserting Securities Act claims.  As originally 
enacted in 1933, the Securities Act vested subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Securities Act claims concurrently in federal and state courts.  But Section 
 
Comment, The Securities Act of 1933 After SLUSA:  Federal Class Actions Belong in 
Federal Court, 85 N.C. L. REV. 669 (2007), and Andrew J. Morris & Fatima A. Goss, Why 
Claims Under the Securities Act of 1933 Are Removable to Federal Court, 36 SEC. REG. & 
L. REP. (BNA) 626 (2004) (arguing, for varying and sometimes conflicting reasons, that 
Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions should proceed only in federal courts), with J. 
Tyler Butts, Note, Removal of Covered Class Actions Under SLUSA:  The Failure of Plain 
Meaning and Legislative Intent as Interpretive Devices, and the Supreme Court’s Decisive 
Solution, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 169 (2010), and Jordan A. Costa, Note, Removal of 
the Securities Act of 1933 Claims After SLUSA:  What Congress Changed, and What It Left 
Alone, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1193 (2004) (arguing, for varying and sometimes conflicting 
reasons, that Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions may proceed in state courts). 
 9.  See infra Part VI. 
 10.  Section 16 of the Securities Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p.  Citations by 
authorities to “Section 16” or to “Section 77p” refer to this same section. 
 11.  See infra Part II.C.3. 
 12.  See infra Part VI. 
 13.  See infra Part III.B. 
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101(a)(3)(A) of SLUSA (the “Jurisdictional Amendment”) expressly 
amended the Securities Act’s jurisdictional provision to divest state courts 
of subject-matter jurisdiction over Exclusively Federal Securities Class 
Actions.14  Because state courts no longer have subject-matter jurisdiction 
over these actions, such actions cannot be adjudicated there, and can be 
removed to federal court under the Judicial Code’s general “federal 
question” removal provision.15  Until recently, every one of those courts 
that did address SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment universally agreed 
that it divested state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over Exclusively 
Federal Securities Class Actions,16 as perhaps most thoroughly explained in 
a 2009 decision from the Southern District of New York, Knox v. Agria 
Corp.17 
The second recurring error courts make in deciding the proper 
jurisdiction for these cases is when they ask whether state courts are 
competent to hear class actions brought under the Securities Act, but reach 
the wrong answer and hold that they are.  This error has arisen in a line of 
authority headed by a 2011 decision from a California state appeals court, 
Luther v. Countrywide Financial Corp.,18 which disputes the reasoning used 
by the court in Knox.  This conflict, over an issue as fundamental as 
subject-matter jurisdiction, presents a serious concern.  A state court that 
proceeds to hear and adjudicate a federal action over which it has no 
subject-matter jurisdiction is acting ultra vires.  Because subject-matter 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred even by the consent of the parties, any 
judgment on the merits is subject to reversal (either on direct appeal or, 
later, in an action to enforce a judgment).  Further, any settlement is subject 
to collateral attack.  Beyond just the waste of judicial and party resources 
that proceeding before a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction can 
produce, the inconsistent patch-work of decisions fundamentally 
undermines the goals animating the PSLRA and SLUSA:  consistent 
federal adjudication of class actions asserting claims arising under the 
federal securities laws. 
This Article maintains that this conflict between the Knox and Luther 
lines of cases is illusory.  SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment clearly 
divests state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over some category of 
class actions alleging Securities Act claims.  The Luther line of cases 
 
 14.  The Jurisdictional Amendment is separate and distinct from the new rights of 
removal SLUSA created in Section 16(c) of the Securities Act, which were enacted by a 
separate section of SLUSA, Section 101(a)(1).  See infra Part VI. 
 15.  See infra Part III.B. 
 16.  See infra Parts III.A-B. 
 17.  613 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 18.  125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011). 
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disagree — but if SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment does not divest state 
courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over Exclusively Federal Securities 
Class Actions, what does it do?  Luther, quite notably, fails to answer this 
question at all.  Its progeny attempt to do so by arguing that the 
Jurisdictional Amendment eliminates state court jurisdiction over class 
actions that allege Securities Act claims if they also allege pendent state 
law claims.  This theory, however, cannot be squared with Kircher v. 
Putnam Funds Trust,19 in which the Supreme Court expressly held that, 
post-SLUSA, state courts retain jurisdiction over actions asserting 
securities-based state law claims.20  This leaves only one valid 
interpretation of SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment — it eliminates state 
court jurisdiction over class actions asserting Securities Act claims, i.e., 
Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions.  Further, this textual reading 
is also the only one consistent with SLUSA’s legislative purpose and 
federalism precepts. 
Part I of this Article begins by examining the history of the Securities 
Act, the PSLRA, SLUSA and the background of Securities Act claims and 
class actions leading up to SLUSA’s amendments.  Part II engages in a 
review and analysis of SLUSA’s statutory text and the revisions it made to 
the Securities Act.  Part III looks specifically at SLUSA’s Jurisdictional 
Amendment and its effects on the jurisdictional provision of the Securities 
Act and explains how it divests state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction 
over Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions, before turning to an 
examination of the legal errors made by Luther and its progeny in reaching 
their contrary conclusions.  Parts IV and V explain how SLUSA’s 
legislative history and purpose and the precepts of federalism further 
compel the conclusion that Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions 
should proceed only before federal courts.  Finally, Part VI examines the 
current confused state of the case law caused by courts that have 
overlooked or ignored SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment and focused on 
the “wrong” question — the removal provision of Section 16(c) of the 
Securities Act — and explains how a proper focus by courts on the 
threshold jurisdictional issues presented by the Jurisdictional Amendment 
can untangle the conflicts in the case law going forward. 
 
 19.  547 U.S. 633 (2006). 
 20.  See infra Part III.C.3. 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT, THE PSLRA AND SLUSA 
A. The Securities Act of 1933 
As originally drafted following the Great Depression, the Securities 
Act allowed plaintiffs a near-absolute right to choose their preferred forum 
as between federal and state court.  That jurisdiction was conferred through 
two separate provisions.  The first sentence of Section 22(a)21 (the 
Securities Act’s “Jurisdictional Provision”) vested subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Securities Act claims concurrently in federal and state 
courts.22  The general right of “federal question” removal set forth in title 
28, section 1441(a) would normally allow defendants in actions alleging 
federal Securities Act claims but brought in state court to remove such 
actions to federal court.23  The penultimate sentence of Section 22(a) of the 
Securities Act, however, instituted a “Removal Bar” to carve out certain 
actions alleging Securities Act claims from the general “federal question” 
right of removal.24 
 
 21.  Section 22 of the Securities Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v.  Citations by 
authorities to “Section 22” or to “Section 77v” refer to this same section. 
 22.  Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 22, 48 Stat. 74, 86; see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77v(a) (1987) (“The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any 
Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this subchapter and under 
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, and, concurrent 
with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce 
any liability or duty created by this subchapter.”) (amended 1998). 
 23.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that federal district courts “shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States,” and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that,  
[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil 
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or 
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district 
and division embracing the place where such action is pending. 
 24.  Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 22, 48 Stat. 74, 87; see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77v(a) (1987) (amended 1998).  There is little if any legislative history explaining why 
Congress saw fit to vest jurisdiction for federal Securities Act claims concurrently in federal 
and state courts, or why it sought to impose a Removal Bar preventing cases brought in state 
court from being removed to federal court.  See Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the 
Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 
55 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 621, 632-33 (2006).  Courts and commentators have recognized that 
these provisions were intended to serve as plaintiff-friendly measures and allow plaintiffs an 
absolute right to the forum of their choice, over any objections by defendants.  See 
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 
762, 768 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Civil suits asserting claims under the Securities Act are within the 
‘arising under’ clause of Article III and can easily be brought as original actions in federal 
court.  15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).  Although expressed as a bar on removal of such cases from state 
court, section 22(a)’s aim is not to preclude hearing such cases in federal court but instead to 
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The Removal Bar is not absolute.  It provides that “[n]o case arising 
under [the Securities Act] and brought in any State court of competent 
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.”25  By its 
plain terms, the Removal Bar does not apply to cases arising under the 
Securities Act that are brought in a state court that lacks competent 
jurisdiction.  The Removal Bar’s jurisdictional limitation was an academic 
point in the sixty years between the enactment of the Securities Act and the 
enactment of the PSLRA and SLUSA, however, because situations in 
which an action alleging Securities Act claims might be brought in a state 
court that lacked jurisdiction came up rarely if ever.  In part, this was 
because the Securities Act’s original Jurisdictional Provision vested 
subject-matter jurisdiction over actions alleging Securities Act claims 
concurrently in federal and state courts, and hence state courts of general 
jurisdiction were courts “of competent jurisdiction” for the purposes of the 
Removal Bar26 — but also significant was the fact that economically 
significant securities actions were generally not filed in state court to begin 
with, and hence the question of state courts’ jurisdictional competence 
tended not to arise in the first place.  Rather, “the plaintiffs’ bar had 
apparently concluded that the best place to litigate their cases was in the 
federal courts.  Although in theory a state court remedy might also have 
been pursued, in fact state court remedies were left largely unnoticed by the 
plaintiffs’ bar for the more than sixty years.”27 
 
‘favor plaintiffs’ choice of forum.’” (quoting Pinto v. Maremont Corp., 326 F. Supp. 165, 
167 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1971))) (internal brackets omitted); see also Cook, supra, at 634.  
Commentators have offered several additional theories as to why Congress made Securities 
Act claims non-removable, including recognizing a “complementary, historic interacting 
federal-state relationship[,] . . . . reducing the burdens on federal courts, preserving a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum and preventing the ‘federalization’ of traditional areas of state 
law.”  Cook, supra, at 633-34.  
 25.  Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 22, 48 Stat. 74, 87 (emphasis added); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1987) (amended 1998). 
 26.  States can and do impose their own limits on jurisdiction on certain courts (e.g., 
small claims court), so it was possible even before SLUSA for an action alleging Securities 
Act claims to be brought in a state court that lacked competent jurisdiction — but it would 
be a rare case indeed where a plaintiff would make such an obvious mistake rather than 
filing its claim in a state court with more general jurisdiction. 
 27.  The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 
47 (1998) [hereinafter H. Subcomm. SLUSA Hearing] (statement of David L. Anderson, 
Pillsbury Madison & Sutro LLP); see also The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1997 — S. 1260:  Hearing before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 70 (1998) [hereinafter S. Subcomm. 1998 SLUSA 
Hearing] (statement of John F. Olson, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher) (“[s]tate court class 
actions involving nationally traded securities were virtually unknown prior to the PSLRA”); 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3-4 (1998). 
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B. The PSLRA, the “Unintended Consequence” of Securities Class 
Actions Shifting to State Court, and SLUSA’s Remedy Thereof 
Plaintiffs’ preference for filing securities class actions in federal court 
changed sharply and radically, however, following the 1995 passage of the 
PSLRA. 
The PSLRA was enacted in response to perceived securities litigation 
abuses, particularly suits brought as class actions.28  Congress recognized 
the potential for abuse in “the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of 
securities and others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer’s 
stock price, without regarding to any underlying culpability of the issuer, 
and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to 
some plausible cause of action” that “target[] deep pocket defendants, 
including accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered 
by insurance, without regard to their actual culpability” — so-called “strike 
suits” — and “abuse . . . the discovery process to impose costs so 
burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle.”29  
The PSLRA was designed to combat these abuses by instituting numerous 
reforms:  among them, limiting recoverable damages and attorneys’ fees, 
providing a “safe harbor” for forward-looking statements, imposing new 
restrictions on the selection of (and compensation awarded to) lead 
plaintiffs, mandating the imposition of sanctions for frivolous litigation, 
and authorizing an automatic stay of discovery pending the resolution of 
any motion to dismiss.30 
 
 28.  See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) 
(“[T]he House Conference Report accompanying what would later be enacted as the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 . . . identified ways in which the class-action 
device was being used to injure ‘the entire U.S. economy.’  According to the Report, 
nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests, and 
‘manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent’ had 
become rampant in recent years. . . .  [The PSLRA] represents Congress’ effort to curb these 
perceived abuses.”) (citations omitted).  As commentators have noted, Congress had not 
anticipated anything like the current system of securities class actions when it first 
promulgated the Securities Act in 1933.  See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Fraud and 
Federalism:  Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
273, 283-84 (1998) (“Nor is it likely that Congress anticipated anything like the current state 
of private securities litigation.  The class action device did not exist until Congress passed 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.  Modern class action litigation and the rise in 
securities fraud class actions had to await the SEC’s support of private securities law 
enforcement in the early to mid-1960s and the liberalization of Rule 23 in 1966.”). 
 29.  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 
730; see also Dabit, 547 U.S. at 81 (“Proponents of the [PSLRA] argued that these abuses 
resulted in extortionate settlements, chilled any discussion of issuers’ future prospects, and 
deterred qualified individuals from serving on boards of directors.”). 
 30.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77z-2 (the PSLRA’s amendments to the Securities Act); 
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Some of the PSLRA’s protections apply to any action alleging claims 
under the federal securities laws, whether brought as a class action or an 
individual action and whether brought in federal or state court.31  Other 
PSLRA reforms are specifically directed to class actions.32  For this latter 
category, however, the wording of the PSLRA is such that the reforms 
might only apply to class actions brought in federal court.33  For example, 
one chief concern driving the promulgation of the PSLRA was the 
proliferation of “lawyer-driven lawsuits” and the practice of “plaintiffs’ 
lawyers ‘rac[ing] to the courthouse’ to be the first to file a securities class 
action complaint,” often filed in the name of a “professional plaintiff” with 
little actual financial stake in the litigation, in order to win designation as 
counsel for the class34 — and the attendant counsel fees from any 
settlement35 — following which the plaintiffs’ lawyers would pay their 
 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4, 78u-5 (the PSLRA’s amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the “Exchange Act”)); see also Dabit, 547 U.S. at 81.  For a fuller description of the 
changes that the PSLRA effected to the federal securities laws, see, for example, THOMAS 
LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.17 (2014) (re 
Securities Act); id. § 12.15 (re Exchange Act).  
 31.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)-(d), 77z-2 (“In any private action arising under this 
subchapter . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. ARM Fin. 
Grp., Inc., No. 99 CIV 12046 WHP, 2001 WL 300733, at *4, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3332, 
at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2001).  For example, the PSLRA’s automatic stay of 
discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending applies to Securities Act claims brought in 
state court as well as federal court.  See Milano v. Auhll, No. SB 213 476, 1996 WL 
33398997, at *2-3 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1996) (“It appears to this court that 
Congress intended the provisions creating a new right on the part of defendants, to put 
plaintiffs to the burden of pleading and offering to prove specific allegations under the 1933 
Act, and to a stay of discovery until plaintiffs meet the burden, to be applied to all cases in 
state as well as federal courts if at least one cause of action is within these amendments.”); 
Shores v. Cinergi Pictures Entm’t Inc., No. BC149861, Notice of Ruling 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
L.A. Cnty. Sept. 5, 1996) (“[T]he automatic stay provision in Section 27(b) of the Securities 
Act applies to all cases filed under the Securities Act, whether in state or federal court.”). 
 32.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(1) (“The provisions of this subsection shall apply to each 
private action arising under this subchapter that is brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 33.  See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC (In re Countrywide Fin. 
Corp. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 934 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1231-33 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (holding 
that class actions in state court are not subject to the requirements set out in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77z-1(a)(1) because “[t]he provisions of th[at] subsection shall apply to each private 
action arising under this subchapter that is brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”) (emphasis added). 
 34.  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32-34, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 731-33; 
accord S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 9-11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688-90. 
 35.  See, e.g., In re Molson Coors Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 147, 149 & n.4 
(D. Del. 2005) (describing the appointment of lead plaintiff as a determination of “which of 
the plaintiffs’ law firms will win the money race. . . .  It is the lead counsel who stands to 
gain, not the lead plaintiff . . . .  [S]ecurities lawyers are involved, lawyers who are vying for 
the chance to take the laboring oar in litigation and the monetary rewards that go with it.”). 
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“professional plaintiffs” a “‘bonus’ far in excess of their share of any 
recovery.”36  To combat this practice, the PSLRA included a number of 
class action reforms, including requirements that would-be lead plaintiffs 
filing a class action file sworn certifications establishing their bona fides37 
and publish a notice advising other potential class members of the existence 
of the action and that other potential class members can move to replace the 
original filer as lead plaintiff, with a statutory preference for the member 
with the largest financial stake,38 prohibiting lead plaintiffs from receiving 
“bonuses” in excess of the recovery of the rest of the class,39 and barring 
plaintiffs’ lawyers from receiving more than a “reasonable percentage” of 
the class’s actual recovery.40  But class actions filed in state court might not 
be subject to these provisions “and so are more likely to permit such 
abuse[s]” to continue.41 
 
 36. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 689. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2). 
 38. Id. § 77z-1(a)(3). 
 39. Id. § 77z-1(a)(4). 
 40. Id. § 77z-1(a)(6). 
 41. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC (In re Countrywide Fin. 
Corp. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig.), 934 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1233 (C.D. Cal. 2013).  In many 
instances, the Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions being filed in state court are 
parallel suits brought by plaintiffs with little actual financial stake that assert substantially 
the same claims as class actions brought in federal court brought by institutional plaintiffs 
with large actual financial interests.  See, e.g., In re King Pharm., 230 F.R.D. 503, 505 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2004) (“[I]f the Court were to remand the movants’ class actions, there would be 
concurrent class actions in state and federal court asserting substantially similar claims. This 
could lead to considerable confusion if not outright inconsistent results.”).  For example, the 
plaintiff that brought the state court class action in Brady v. Kosmos Energy Ltd., No. DC-
12-00251-C (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dallas Cnty.) could only assert $1908 in damages, as compared 
to the eventual lead plaintiff of the consolidated federal class action, and its $717,659 in 
asserted damages.  See In re Kosmos Energy Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 3:12-CV-373-B, 2012 WL 
6199318, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2012) (listing and comparing state plaintiff’s alleged 
damages with eventual federal lead plaintiff’s, and appointing the latter as lead plaintiff 
pursuant to the PSLRA due to its larger actual financial stake).  Similarly, the plaintiff that 
brought the state court class action in Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., Ltd., No. 16242/2006 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty.), could only assert that he purchased 500 shares of the defendant 
company, as compared to the eventual lead plaintiff of the consolidated federal class action, 
and its purchase of 116,100 shares.  Compare Certification of Plaintiff [Michael Rubin] ¶ 4, 
West End Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lee, No. 1:06-cv-02951-TPG (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2006), 
ECF No. 4-2 (listing state plaintiff’s alleged damages), with Certification [of Plaintiff West 
End Capital Management, LLC] in Support of Application for Lead Plaintiffs sched., West 
End Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lee, No. 1:06-cv-02951-TPG (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2006), ECF 
No. 19-2 (listing eventual federal lead plaintiff’s alleged damages).  These small-stake 
plaintiffs could never qualify under the PSLRA for lead plaintiff status of a consolidated 
federal action; in state court, however, where these PSLRA reforms and the consolidation 
rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are unavailable, these minor plaintiffs can 
bring a duplicative strike suit in the hopes of extracting an additional settlement. 
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As a result, the PSLRA had an “unintended consequence”42:  to avoid 
these PSLRA requirements, securities class action plaintiffs, who had 
previously brought their actions in federal court, began a dramatic shift 
towards bringing them in state court.43  As Congress found: 
 
Prior to the passage of the [PSLRA], there was essentially no 
significant securities class action litigation brought in State 
court. . . .  [S]ince passage of the [PSLRA], plaintiffs’ lawyers 
have sought to circumvent the [PSLRA]’s provisions by 
exploiting differences between Federal and State laws by filing 
frivolous and speculative lawsuits in State court, where 
essentially none of the [PSLRA]’s procedural or substantive 
protections against abusive suits are available.44 
 
As one of the principal co-sponsors of SLUSA frankly stated, “I think if we 
had ever anticipated that there would be a shift to State courts that we 
would have had language in the [PSLRA] to address this.  We simply 
didn’t think of it at the time.”45 
 
 42.  See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006). 
 43.  See id. at 82. 
 44.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998); see S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3-4 (1998) 
(“Former SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest summarized this post [PSLRA] increase in 
state securities class actions in testimony co-authored with his fellow Stanford Law School 
faculty member Michael Perino: [‘]The relative stability of the aggregate litigation rate 
masks a significant shift of activity from federal to state court * * *.  There is widespread 
agreement that these figures represent a substantial increase in state court litigation.  Two 
phenomena seem to explain the bulk of this shift.  First, there appears to be a ‘substitution 
effect’ whereby plaintiff’s counsel file state court complaints when the underlying facts 
appear not to satisfy new, more stringent federal pleading requirements, or otherwise seek to 
avoid the substantive or procedural provisions of the Act.  Second plaintiffs appear to be 
resorting to increased parallel state and federal litigation in an effort to avoid federal 
discovery stays or to establish alternative state court venues for settlement of federal 
claims.[’] While there was some disagreement as to the exact size of the increase in state 
class-action filings, the overall evidence received by the Committee is compelling.  As one 
witness testified ‘(t)he single fact is that state-court class actions involving nationally traded 
securities were virtually unknown prior to the [PSLRA]; they are brought with some 
frequency now.’”); Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82; see also Perino, supra note 28, at 308-09 (“The 
data . . . suggest that the increase in state court actions is largely driven by a shift in the 
number of publicly traded issuers sued in state court since the [PSLRA]. . . .  In the sample 
of 1992-1994 state class actions, only six involved publicly traded issuers.  By contrast, in 
only the first eighteen months under the Reform Act, the vast majority of state court class 
actions, seventy-seven in all, involved publicly traded securities.  The timing of this sudden 
upswing in state court filings supports the inference that the shift in forum selection was 
driven by the passage of the [PSLRA].”). 
 45.  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban 
Affairs to Amend the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to 
Limit the Conduct of Securities Class Actions Under State Law, and for Other Purposes, 
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In 1997, Senators Phil Gramm and Chris Dodd, respectively the 
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, 
jointly introduced a bill designed to close this “loophole [that] was being 
exploited” and ensure that national securities class actions would have to be 
filed only in federal court and be subject to federal standards, including the 
PSLRA.46  Following a year of hearings, congressional debate and revisions 
to the bill, Congress moved forward to stem the “shift[] from Federal to 
State courts” and “prevent certain State private securities class action 
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the 
[PSLRA]”47 by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 
1998. 
II. A TEXTUAL EXAMINATION OF SLUSA’S AMENDMENTS TO THE 
SECURITIES ACT 
A. SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment 
SLUSA combatted two shifts prompted by the PSLRA.  First, SLUSA 
precluded the assertion in class actions of state law claims that overlapped 
with private remedies available under the Securities Act (and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934).48  Second, SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment 
eliminated the subject-matter jurisdiction of state courts to hear certain 
Securities Act class actions.  Whereas the Securities Act’s Jurisdictional 
Provision had originally vested concurrent jurisdiction over actions 
alleging Securities Act claims in both federal and state courts, SLUSA’s 
Jurisdictional Amendment revised it to instead read: 
 
 
105th Cong. 8 (1997) [hereinafter S. Subcomm. 1997 SLUSA Hearing] (statement of Rep. 
Anna Eshoo). 
 46.  See S. 1260, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1997); S. Subcomm. 1997 SLUSA Hearing, 
supra note 45, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Phil Gramm, Chairman, Subcomm. on Sec. 
of S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs) (“We held a hearing earlier this year to 
take a look at how the [PSLRA] was being received and how it was working.  We 
discovered from that hearing that a new loophole was being exploited, that what was 
occurring is that there has been a shift of these lawsuits into State courts.  So Senator Dodd 
and I thought about this, looked at it, and decided to introduce a bill that basically says that 
for class action suits, and class action suits only, where you are dealing with a stock that is 
traded nationally, so there is clearly an overriding national interest, that those suits have to 
be filed in Federal court.”). 
 47.  Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2(2), 
(5), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227; see Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82. 
 48.  See infra Parts II.C.2-3.  SLUSA made several exceptions not relevant here for 
certain specific state law claims, such as claims based on the law of the state in which the 
issuer is incorporated.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(d), 78bb(f)(3); see also infra Part II.C.4. 
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The district courts of the United States and the United States 
courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and 
violations under this subchapter and under the rules and 
regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, 
and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, except as 
provided in section 77p of this title [Section 16 of the Securities 
Act] with respect to covered class actions, of all suits in equity 
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created 
by this subchapter.49 
 
“When Congress acts to amend a statute, . . . it intends its amendment 
to have real and substantial effect.”50  The Jurisdictional Amendment 
altered the Jurisdictional Provision — and the effect of this amendment, by 
its plain terms, was to eliminate state court jurisdiction over some category 
of actions over which state courts previously had jurisdiction concurrent 
with federal courts.51 
The Jurisdictional Amendment does not itself precisely define this 
excluded category.  It provides that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
over actions alleging Securities Act claims “except as provided in [Section 
16] with respect to covered class actions”52 — but “covered class action” is 
a term undefined in either SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment or in the 
Securities Act’s Jurisdictional Provision that SLUSA amends.53  It is 
defined in Section 16 of the Securities Act, as amended by SLUSA — 
specifically Section 16(f), a subsection entitled “Definitions,” where all of 
SLUSA’s defined terms are located.54 
 
 49.  15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (language added by SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment 
emphasized). 
 50.  Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 
103, 109-11 (1990); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)). 
 51.  See generally McIntosh v. Partridge, 540 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that where a statute that formerly allowed individuals to bring an action in federal court was 
“replaced . . . with a provision that only mentions the ability of individuals to bring 
claims . . . in state court,” courts must respect and enforce this divestiture of jurisdiction, as 
“[i]f [a court] were to hold that the removal of the statutory language authorizing federal 
jurisdiction for these suits did not actually remove federal jurisdiction, [it] would be 
violating a basic tenant of statutory construction:  when Congress amends a law the 
amendment is made to effect some purpose”) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 52.  15 U.S.C. § 77v. 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  Id. § 77p(f). 
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B. SLUSA’s Definitions as Provided in Section 16 of the Securities Act 
“Covered class action” is a specialized “term of art.”55  Unique to 
SLUSA, it does not just refer to “class actions,” as the term is commonly 
understood and used in other aspects of federal law.56  While “covered class 
actions” include traditional class actions,57 it also expands “class actions” in 
a non-standard manner to cover a broader range of actions. This includes 
certain actions seeking damages for fifty or more parties and groups of 
separately-filed actions joined or consolidated and pending in the same 
court.58  In doing so, Section 16 defines SLUSA’s overall reach, not just 
with respect to the Jurisdictional Amendment, but with respect to SLUSA’s 
other reforms as well.59 
This definition of “covered class action” applies to all of Section 16.60  
But there is nothing in Section 16 making the definition applicable to any 
other section of the Securities Act, such as the Jurisdictional Provision, 
which is located in Section 22(a).61  In amending the Securities Act’s 
Jurisdictional Provision, had SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment simply 
used the term “covered class action” without more, the term would have 
been undefined.62  The cross-reference to Section 16 provided by SLUSA’s 
Jurisdictional Amendment bridges that gap. 
The split between the Knox and Luther lines of precedent arises from 
the language used in the cross-reference:  specifically, the fact that it says 
 
 55.  See Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 56.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (describing class actions), with 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2) 
(describing “covered class actions” as defined under SLUSA). 
 57.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
 58.  Id. §§ 77p(f)(2)(A)(i)(I), (ii).  
 59.  Congress was concerned that limiting SLUSA’s reforms to “true” class actions as 
defined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 would be overly restrictive and allow 
plaintiffs “a loophole to bring a single suit that names many plaintiffs” while avoiding the 
specific requirements set out in Rule 23, in order to keep their actions outside the reach of 
SLUSA.  See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 7 (1998).  As a result, Congress defined the term of art 
“covered class action” to expand beyond “true” class actions to cover these other actions if 
they sought damages for more than fifty parties.  See id. 
 60.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(f). 
 61.  Id. (“For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); see, e.g., Vt. Agency of Nat’l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 783-84 (2000) (definition in one section of statute that “contains a provision 
expressly defining [term] ‘for purposes of this section’” suggests that definition does not 
apply to other sections of statute) (internal brackets omitted); In re Princo Corp., 486 F.3d 
1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Even when the definition appears in a single statute, . . . 
definitions limited to one section should not be applied to another section.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 62.  The term “covered class action” is only used in Section 16 itself, and in the 
Jurisdictional Provision in conjunction with explicit cross-references to Section 16; the term 
is never used anywhere in the Securities Act without an express reference to Section 16. 
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“except as provided in [Section 16] with respect to covered class actions”63 
(instead of, for example, “except with respect to covered class actions as 
defined in Section 16”).  The Knox line maintains that the cross-reference is 
to the definition of “covered class action” in Section 1664; the Luther line 
maintains that it is intended to place an additional substantive limitation on 
the Jurisdictional Amendment, such that only actions that are covered class 
actions and that satisfy some other set of conditions set out in Section 16 
are excluded from state court jurisdiction.65 
Before addressing the lines of reasoning in Knox and Luther, 
respectively, it is worth briefly examining the five other subsections that 
comprise Section 16 to see what alternatives there are, if any, for what this 
other substantive limitation could be. 
C. The Other Provisions in Section 16 of the Securities Act 
Prior to the enactment of SLUSA, Section 16 of the Securities Act 
simply read, “The rights and remedies provided by this subchapter shall be 
in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or 
in equity.”66  SLUSA § 101(a)(1) wholly redrafted this section, however, 
replacing the old provision with six new subsections that established many 
of SLUSA’s core reforms. 
1. Section 16(a) – General Reservation of Rights 
The new Section 16(a) retains the reservation of rights language of the 
old Section 16, stating that the remedies provided by the Securities Act are 
non-exclusive and that other remedies that might exist with respect to 
securities fraud are preserved, except with respect to those remedies that 
are precluded in Section 16(b).67  This subsection does not use or depend 
upon the term “covered class action.” 
2. Section 16(b) – Preclusion 
Section 16(b), one of SLUSA’s “core” provisions,68 precludes 
plaintiffs from maintaining class actions involving nationally traded 
securities that plead certain state law claims. 
 
 63.  15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added). 
 64.  See infra Part III.B. 
 65.  See infra Part III.C. 
 66.  15 U.S.C. § 77p (1933) (amended 1998).  
 67.  Id. § 77v(a). 
 68.  See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006). 
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One of the chief concerns raised before Congress that prompted 
SLUSA’s enactment was the threat that national securities issuers were 
potentially subject to suit in any state court pursuant to any state’s laws, 
subjecting national issuers to a patchwork of fifty different legislative 
regimes.69  To stymie this, SLUSA promulgated a new Section 16(b) of the 
Securities Act, which precludes class actions from alleging certain state law 
claims with respect to nationally traded securities.  Specifically, Section 
16(b) provides: 
 
(b) Class action limitations 
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common 
law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any 
State or Federal court by any private party alleging — 
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or 
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a covered security.70 
 
 69.  See S. Subcomm. 1997 SLUSA Hearing, supra note 45, at 29, 83 (statement of 
Daniel Cooperman, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary, Oracle Corp., 
on behalf of the Software Publishers Association) (“The question before us in evaluating the 
Uniform Standards Act is whether the predictability and stability of our capital markets is 
being undermined by a patchwork of duplicative and, in some cases, inconsistent State 
laws . . . [I]n our view it is bad law, bad policy, and bad economics to . . . . provid[e] 
plaintiffs with alternatives to circumvent the Federal initiative.”) (emphasis in original); id. 
at 33 (statement of Michael A. Perino, Lecturer at Stanford Law School and Co-Director of 
the Law School’s Roberts Program in Law, Business, and Corporate Governance) 
(“[H]aving a patchwork quilt of different rules that apply to different customers in different 
States makes no sense at all.”); see also Perino, supra note 28, at 316-17 (“Allowing 
individual states to assert jurisdiction over transactions in national markets also imposes 
significant costs on companies that do business in more than one state or who have a 
significant corporate presence in multiple states.  If state law causes of action are permitted, 
such companies could be exposed to litigation in multiple states under multiple procedural 
and substantive standards.  Even if litigation could be confined to one forum, enormously 
complicated choice of law questions will likely arise regarding the application of different 
states’ laws to different members of the class.  A court may have to apply as many as fifty 
different substantive legal standards to members of the class.  The resulting confusion and 
complexity could replicate many of the management problems that pervade mass tort and 
other kinds of class actions based on state law.”); cf. Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 
674 N.E.2d 282, 290 (N.Y. 1996) (noting that Congress may preempt state statutory and 
common law causes of action in the securities context where “[s]ecurities [participants], 
confronted with the risk of nationwide class action civil damage liability . . . would be 
impelled to tailor their disclosures to each State’s common-law . . . jurisprudence, and the 
carefully crafted [federal] disclosure requirements would have little, if any, influence”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 70.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(b).  A “covered security,” generally speaking, is a security listed 
and traded on a national securities exchange.  Id. §§ 77p(f)(3), 77r(b); see Chadbourne & 
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Section 16(b) “does not . . . displace state law with federal law” or 
interfere with any plaintiff’s right to bring state law claims individually; it 
only precludes plaintiffs from seeking to use the class action device to 
enforce such claims (or to bring such claims on behalf of more than fifty 
plaintiffs).71  Pursuant to Section 16(b), such state law claims cannot be 
maintained in class actions in any court, federal or state, and are subject to 
dismissal.72  In other words, following SLUSA, the only claims that can be 
brought using the class action device alleging misrepresentations or 
omissions with respect to nationally traded securities are claims under the 
federal securities laws — if plaintiffs want to bring a class action, they 
must seek federal remedies and comply with federal standards.73 
3. Section 16(c) – Removal 
In addition to the concerns about subjecting national securities issuers 
to a patchwork of fifty different state laws, Congress was also concerned 
about subjecting issuers to class action suits in state courts, in which many 
of the protections of the PSLRA are unavailable.74  Prior to SLUSA, it was 
relatively easy for plaintiffs to bring economically significant class actions 
against national securities issuers in state courts and to prevent them from 
being removable to federal court.75  To remedy this, Congress enacted 
 
Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1064 (2014); Dabit, 547 U.S. at 83. Thus, Section 
16(b) embraces both traditional fraud claims involving securities analogous to the implied 
private right of action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and non-fraud-based claims 
alleging misstatements or omissions in the purchase or sale of a security analogous to claims 
under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. 
 71.  Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 636 n.1 (2006) (“The preclusion 
provision is often called a preemption provision; the Act, however, does not itself displace 
state law with federal law but makes some state-law claims nonactionable through the class-
action device in federal as well as state court.” (citing Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87-88)). 
 72.  Id.  See generally Troice, 134 S. Ct. at 1064 (stating if SLUSA preclusion does not 
apply, “the plaintiffs may maintain their state-law-based class actions, and they may do so 
either in federal or state court.  Otherwise, their class actions are precluded altogether.”).  
 73.  See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87-88. 
 74.  See supra Part I.B. 
 75.  See, e.g., Kircher, 547 U.S. at 637, 641-42 & n.10 (involving covered class actions 
relating to covered securities brought by plaintiffs alleging only state law claims that were 
not subject to diversity jurisdiction and consequently, absent SLUSA, could not be removed 
to federal court).  At the time of SLUSA’s enactment, defendants were barred from 
removing class actions that lacked a “well-pleaded” federal claim if even a single named 
plaintiff was a citizen of the same state as any defendant or if the action was brought in a 
state of which any defendant was a citizen, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996) (amended 2005); 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), giving plaintiffs numerous means of preventing defendants from 
removing even economically significant securities class actions relating to nationally traded 
securities to federal court.  See, e.g., Cook, supra note 24, at 642-43 (“One noted maneuver 
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Section 16(c), which granted defendants new rights of removal.  
Specifically, Section 16(c) provides: 
 
(c) Removal of covered class actions 
Any covered class action brought in any State court 
involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this 
section, shall be removable to the Federal district court for the 
district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to 
subsection (b) of this section.76 
 
Section 16(c), in effect, expands the scope of federal question 
jurisdiction to include covered class actions involving nationally traded 
securities for which there would otherwise be no federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction (e.g., covered class actions between non-diverse parties that 
allege only state law claims) and grants a new vehicle for removing these 
actions to federal court.77  Section 16(c) does not alter jurisdiction or 
removal with respect to covered class actions that already present a federal 
question, i.e., class actions that allege a claim under the federal securities 
laws; it simply extends rights of removal (and, implicitly, jurisdiction) over 
a new class of covered class actions.78 
4. Section 16(d) – Preservation of Certain State Law Claims 
Section 16(d) excludes from Section 16(b)’s scope certain state law 
claims based on the law of the state in which the issuer is incorporated, and 
 
was preventing removal of class actions by bringing only state law claims and artfully 
pleading around the requirements of diversity jurisdiction.  That is, plaintiffs’ lawyers would 
name parties of certain state citizenship to destroy complete diversity and/or seek less than 
the requisite amount-in-controversy for any one plaintiff in order to remain in state court.”) 
(citations omitted).  Section 16(c) was hence needed to provide increased removal rights to 
defendants.  Seven years later, Congress further increased defendants’ right to remove 
economically significant class actions from state court to federal court when it enacted the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 
§§ 4-5, 119 Stat. 4, 9-13 (expanding federal diversity jurisdiction and removal procedures 
for large class actions). 
 76.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(c). 
 77.  See, e.g., Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“The SLUSA removal provision . . . . confer[s] federal removal jurisdiction over a 
unique class of state law claims.” (citing Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 
(2003))); Winne v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y, 315 F. Supp. 2d 404, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(actions that do not present federal questions or diversity jurisdiction normally not 
removable from state court to federal court are removable where “Congress has expressly 
provided that a state-law claim be removed to federal court, as it did in SLUSA”) (citations 
omitted). 
 78.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(c). 
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certain actions brought by states, subdivisions thereof or state pension 
plans.79 
5. Section 16(e) – Preservation of State Enforcement Actions 
Section 16(e) preserves the right of state securities regulators to 
investigate securities fraud and bring state enforcement actions.80  This 
subsection never uses or depends upon the term “covered class action.” 
6. Section 16(f) – Definitions 
Section 16(f) sets forth all of SLUSA’s defined terms, including the 
definition of “covered class action.”81 
III. UNDERSTANDING SLUSA’S JURISDICTIONAL AMENDMENT AND 
ITS CROSS-REFERENCE TO SECTION 16 
A. Early Interpretation of the Effect of SLUSA’s Jurisdictional 
Amendment 
It was several years following SLUSA’s enactment before courts 
began to examine SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment and its revision to 
the Securities Act’s Jurisdictional Provision.82  At the outset, those courts 
that did examine the Jurisdictional Amendment uniformly held that it 
divested state courts of concurrent jurisdiction over all “covered class 
actions” alleging federal Securities Act claims, i.e., they implicitly 
understood that the Jurisdictional Amendment’s cross-reference to Section 
16 was to the definition of “covered class action” in Section 16, as opposed 
to an additional substantive limitation on the Jurisdictional Amendment’s 
scope. 
One of the first of these early decisions held that “[o]riginally, the 
Securities Act of 1933 did provide that state and federal courts had 
concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under the Act” but that the 
Securities Act as amended by the Jurisdictional Amendment did not grant 
concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over all Securities Act claims.83  A 
 
 79.  Id. § 77p(d). 
 80.  Id. § 77p(e). 
 81.  See supra Part II.B. 
 82.  A number of courts addressing the proper treatment of Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions brought in state court initially tended to erroneously focus solely on 
Section 16(c) and the separate SLUSA § 101(a)(3)(B).  See infra Part VI. 
 83.  Kulinski v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., No. C-2-03-412, 2003 WL 24032299, at *1-
3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26447, at *5-9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2003) (report and 
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subsequent opinion similarly held that “SLUSA amended [Section 22](a) to 
divest state courts of concurrent jurisdiction over covered class 
actions . . . .”84  And, three years later, a trio of decisions each in turn held 
that Congress, by enacting SLUSA, eliminated concurrent state court 
jurisdiction for covered class actions, which made federal court the sole 
venue for securities class actions.85 
B. Knox v. Agria Corp. and a Comprehensive Explanation of SLUSA’s 
Jurisdictional Amendment 
Knox v. Agria Corp.86 explained in full depth the effect of SLUSA’s 
Jurisdictional Amendment and the meaning of its cross-reference to Section 
16, and expressly addressed their effect on the Securities Act’s Removal 
Bar. 
Knox was an Exclusively Federal Securities Class Action that was 
filed in New York state court.87  The defendants removed it pursuant to the 
general federal question removal provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).88  The 
plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the Securities Act’s Removal Bar 
barred cases involving Securities Act claims — including Exclusively 
Federal Securities Class Actions — from being removed to federal court, 
citing a number of decisions holding that the Removal Bar prohibited the 
removal of Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions.89 
 
recommendation), adopted, slip op. (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2004), ECF No. 31.   
 84.  In re King Pharm., 230 F.R.D. 503, 505 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).  A 2004 article that 
examined SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment also arrived at the same conclusion.  Morris 
& Goss, supra note 8, at 630 (“[SLUSA]’s amendments explicitly provide that 1933 Act 
claims that are class actions are not covered by the concurrent-jurisdiction provision . . . .”). 
 85.  Pinto v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-0062 (FLW), 2007 WL 1381746, at *2, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33287, at *5 (D.N.J. May 7, 2007) (SLUSA “divest[s] state courts of 
concurrent jurisdiction over covered class actions”); Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., Ltd., No. 06-
CV-2964 (ERK), 2007 WL 778485, at *5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17671, at *16  (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 13, 2007) (“by enacting SLUSA Congress eliminated concurrent jurisdiction for 
covered class actions, which made federal court the sole venue for securities fraud class 
actions”); Rovner v. Holdings Vonage Corp., No. 07-178 (FLW), 2007 WL 446658, at *4, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8656, at *12 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007) (“the jurisdictional provision in 
section [Section 22](a) . . . grants exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts over all covered 
class actions”). 
 86.  613 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 87.  See id. at 421. 
 88.  See id. 
 89.  See id. at 421-22.  The defendants, in turn, cited numerous cases that held that 
SLUSA had amended the Removal Bar to allow for removal of Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions.  For a fuller discussion of these decisions, see infra Part VI. 
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The Knox court began its analysis by carefully examining the text of 
the Removal Bar.90  It observed that the Removal Bar by its terms is limited 
to “case[s] arising under [the Securities Act] and brought in any State court 
of competent jurisdiction.”91  Cases brought in state courts where the state 
court lacked jurisdiction were outside the scope of the Removal Bar ab 
initio, and hence were removable under the ordinary federal question 
removal statute set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).92  Consequently, the Knox 
court concluded, if SLUSA’s amendments to the Securities Act — and, 
specifically, SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment — divested state courts 
of concurrent jurisdiction over Exclusively Federal Securities Class 
Actions, these actions were outside the scope of the Removal Bar 
altogether, and hence subject to “federal question” removal.93 
Observing that the Securities Act’s Jurisdictional Provision, as 
amended by SLUSA, granted state courts concurrent jurisdiction “except as 
provided in [Section 16] with respect to covered class actions,”94 the Knox 
court examined Section 16 to see what the term “covered class actions” 
meant and what category of actions were now beyond the jurisdiction of 
state courts.  It first observed that two subsections — (a) and (e) — did not 
use the term “covered class actions” at all, and hence did not read upon 
SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment.95  It then examined each of the four 
remaining subsections — (b), (c), (d) and (f) — but noted that all but 
subsection (f) “deal exclusively with state law claims,” whereas the 
Securities Act’s Jurisdictional Provision and SLUSA’s Jurisdictional 
Amendment relate solely to “jurisdiction over ‘suits in equity or actions at 
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by the 1933 Act,’” i.e., 
federal Securities Act claims.96  The Knox court therefore held that “[t]hat 
leaves the definitional provision of Section 16” — Section 16(f) — “as the 
only subsection that can breathe meaning into the SLUSA jurisdictional 
exception.”97 
The reason the Jurisdictional Amendment included a cross-reference 
back to Section 16 was because the term “covered class actions” was both 
otherwise undefined and being used in a non-standard way.  As the Knox 
court explained: 
 
 90.  Id. at 423. 
 91.  15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added); Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 423. 
 92.  See Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 423 (“Because this Court holds that no state court has 
subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions raising 1933 Act claims, it need not 
address the scope of the exception to the anti-removal provision.”). 
 93.  See id. 
 94.  Id. (emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)). 
 95.  Id. at 423-24. 
 96.  Id. (citations and internal brackets omitted). 
 97.  Id. at 424. 
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The reference to Section 16 does not add a substantive limitation 
to the exception to concurrent jurisdiction in Section 22(a); 
rather, it simply points the reader to the definition of a “covered 
class action.”  Construing this reference as a “guide” makes sense 
because the phrase “covered class action” is a term of art crafted 
by Congress.  Untethered from Section 16, the term “covered 
class action” would be susceptible to differing interpretations.  
Thus, the reference to Section 16 dispels any potential ambiguity 
concerning the scope of the exception.98 
 
Consequently, the Jurisdictional Amendment, in using that defined 
term and referring back to Section 16, “exempts covered class actions 
raising 1933 Act claims from concurrent jurisdiction.”99  As a result: 
 
[S]tate courts were no longer “court[s] of competent jurisdiction” 
to hear covered class actions raising 1933 Act claims.  Thus, the 
anti-removal provision does not apply to these covered class 
actions asserting exclusively federal claims. . . .  [B]ecause the 
anti-removal provision only applies to claims brought in a state 
court of competent jurisdiction, once SLUSA stripped state courts 
of subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions raising 
1933 Act claims, the reach of the anti-removal provision receded, 
leaving covered class actions raising 1933 Act claims exclusively 
for federal courts.100 
 
Knox’s holding was followed by a number of courts.  They hold that 
SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment’s reference to Section 16 is intended 
to refer to the definition therein of “covered class actions” and that state 
courts consequently lack jurisdiction over covered class actions alleging 
Securities Act claims, because that is the only interpretation supported by 
the plain text and that gives meaning to the Jurisdictional Amendment.  For 
example, Kramer v. Federal National Mortgage Association (In re Fannie 
Mae 2008 Securities Litigation), explicitly embracing Knox, held that the 
Jurisdictional Amendment divested state courts of jurisdiction over 
Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions and that the Removal Bar 
therefore does not apply to such actions.101  More recently, Lapin v. 
Facebook, Inc., again citing Knox, held that:  
 
 98.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 99.  Id. at 425. 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Kramer v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig.), Nos. 08 
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SLUSA amended [Section 22](a) to exempt such covered class 
actions from [Section 22]’s concurrent jurisdiction provision.  As 
a result, “federal courts alone have jurisdiction to hear covered 
class actions raising 1933 Act claims.” 
As recognized in Knox, and as this Court finds, the effect of 
[the Jurisdictional Amendment] is that the non-removal provision 
in [Section 22](a), on which plaintiffs rely, no longer applies to a 
“covered class action” alleging claims under the 1933 Act, and, 
consequently, a class action brought under the 19[3]3 Act is 
removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).102  
 
Similarly, the most recent decision addressing this issue, Wunsch v. 
American Realty Capital Properties, agreed with Knox’s reasoning to hold 
that Exclusively Federal Securities Class actions should proceed in federal 
court.103 
C. Opposing Views 
But a line of countervailing authority has emerged, primarily among 
California courts, holding that state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction 
over Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions.  In an attempt to 
distinguish Knox and its progeny, these courts argue that the cross-
reference in SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment to Section 16 is not 
meant to simply to refer the definition of the term “covered class action” in 
Section 16(f), but is instead intended to refer to some other portion of 
Section 16, thereby placing an additional substantive limitation on the 
scope of the Jurisdictional Amendment.  In other words, these courts 
maintain that the Jurisdictional Amendment does not exclude covered class 
actions alleging claims arising under the Securities Act from concurrent 
 
Civ. 7831(PAC), 09 Civ. 1352(PAC), 2009 WL 4067266, at *2, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
109888, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2009) (“The exception in the jurisdictional provision of 
Section 22(a) exempts covered class actions raising 1933 Act claims from concurrent 
jurisdiction.  By excluding these covered class actions from concurrent state and federal 
jurisdiction, federal courts alone have jurisdiction to hear them.  After SLUSA, state courts 
were no longer ‘court[s] of competent jurisdiction’ to hear covered class actions raising 
1933 Act claims. Thus, the anti-removal provision does not apply to these covered class 
actions asserting exclusively federal claims.” (quoting Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 425)). 
 102.  Lapin v. Facebook, Inc., Nos. C-12-3195 MMC et al., 2012 WL 3647409, at *3, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119924, at *22-23 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2012) (footnotes and 
citations omitted); see also Serota, supra note 8, at 171-75 (agreeing with the Knox analysis) 
(cited by Lapin, 2012 WL 3647409, at *3, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119924, at *24). 
 103.  Wunsch v. Am. Realty Capital Props., No. JFM-14-4007, 2015 WL 2183035, at 
*1, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48759, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 14, 2005). 
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jurisdiction; it excludes from concurrent jurisdiction only covered class 
actions alleging claims arising under the Securities Act that also comply 
with some other set of conditions set out in Section 16. 
But these courts have been unable to define this other set of 
conditions.  The first and perhaps most well-known of these court 
decisions, Luther v. Countrywide Financial Corp.,104 argues that the 
Jurisdictional Amendment does not exclude Exclusively Federal Securities 
Class Actions from state court jurisdiction — but it provides no alternate 
explanation for what the Jurisdictional Amendment does do.105  Several 
lower courts have attempted to fill the gap in Luther’s reasoning by arguing 
that the cross-reference to Section 16 is intended to refer to Section 16(b) 
and the state law claims precluded therein.  According to these courts, what 
SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment does, therefore, is exclude from state 
court jurisdiction only those class actions alleging federal Securities Act 
claims that are brought with these precluded state law claims, and that class 
actions asserting solely federal claims without state law claims remain 
within the jurisdiction of state courts.  This result, however, cannot be 
squared with Supreme Court precedent.106 
1. Luther v. Countrywide Financial Corp. 
The Luther plaintiffs filed an Exclusively Federal Securities Class 
Action in California state court, alleging violations of the Securities Act 
with respect to certain mortgage pass-through securities.107  At the time the 
case was first filed, Knox had not yet been decided, and the defendants did 
not attempt to make a Knox-type argument that the Securities Act’s 
Removal Bar did not apply.108  Instead, operating under the assumption that 
the Securities Act’s Removal Bar applied to their case and prevented a 
straight removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), the defendants attempted to 
remove the case under a provision in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(“CAFA”),109 which, generally speaking, enacted a right of removal for 
class actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million if there is 
minimal diversity between the parties.110  The plaintiffs moved to remand, 
 
 104.   125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011). 
 105.  See infra Parts III.C.1-2. 
 106.  See infra Part III.C.3. 
 107.  See Luther v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 2:07-CV-08165-MRP(MANx), 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008) (Luther I), aff’d, 533 F.3d 1031 
(9th Cir. 2008) (Luther II). 
 108.  Notice of Removal, Luther v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-08165-MRP-
MAN (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007), ECF No. 1. 
 109.  See Luther I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6. 
 110.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453.  CAFA does not provide for removal of class actions 
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arguing that any removal rights CAFA might provide did not trump the 
Securities Act’s Removal Bar.111 
As no party raised the issue of whether the state court had jurisdiction 
to hear the case in the first instance, the district court did not focus on the 
provision in the Removal Bar that limits its application to “case[s] . . . 
brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction.”112  Instead, the district 
court wrote that the Securities Act’s Removal Bar was an “absolute 
prohibition on removal”113 — an imprecise formulation114 — and expressed 
doubt as to whether CAFA trumped the Removal Bar.115  The court further 
held that, in the event of doubt, it must construe removal narrowly, and 
hence remanded the case.116 
The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  As the district court 
below had done, the Ninth Circuit also flatly — and imprecisely — wrote 
that “§ 22(a) strictly forbids the removal of cases brought in state court and 
asserting claims under the [Securities] Act,” without acknowledging the 
jurisdictional limitations of the Removal Bar.117  The Ninth Circuit also 
held that the Removal Bar trumped any rights of removal under CAFA and 
hence affirmed the district court’s order to remand the case to state court.118 
Following remand to state court, the defendants raised for the first 
time the argument that SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment divested the 
 
involving covered securities, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(9), 1453(d), but the mortgage pass-
through securities at issue in Luther were not covered securities. 
 111.  See Luther I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6. 
 112.  15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added). 
 113.  Luther I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *10. 
 114.  Had the court been asked to squarely confront the “of competent jurisdiction” 
language in the Removal Bar, it would of course have been obligated to give it meaning.  
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (“It is . . . a cardinal principle of 
statutory construction that [a court] must ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word 
of a statute.’” (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955))). 
 115.  Luther I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *10. 
 116.  Id. at *9-10. 
 117.  Luther II, 533 F.3d at 1033.  Both the district court and Ninth Circuit opinions were 
issued before Knox, and the defendants and the courts therefore did not have the benefit of 
Knox’s analysis.  The defendants apparently did not raise the fact that the Removal Bar is 
not actually “absolute” but is limited only to cases brought in state courts “of competent 
jurisdiction” or discuss the meaning of SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment and its effect on 
the Removal Bar, nor did the courts address these issues.  See Luther v. Countrywide Fin. 
Corp., No. CV-09-06162-MRP (JWJx), 2009 WL 3271368, at *1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
100138, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2009) (Luther III). 
 118.  Luther II, 533 F.3d at 1034.  It is worth noting as an aside that other circuits have 
expressly split from Luther II’s interpretation and hold that CAFA’s removal provision does 
trump the Securities Act’s Removal Bar with respect to securities that are not traded on a 
national exchange, leading to a split amongst the courts.  See Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 
562 (7th Cir. 2009); N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortg. Loan Trust 2006-
4, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581, 587-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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state court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the action by filing a 
demurrer seeking to dismiss the action outright on the grounds that the state 
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.119  The state court stayed the 
defendants’ demurrer and ordered the plaintiffs to file a declaratory action 
in federal court to ask the federal court to determine whether, in light of 
Knox, state courts retain or lack jurisdiction over Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions.120  The federal court declined to adjudicate the 
plaintiffs’ action for a declaratory judgment, however, and redirected the 
case to the state court, holding that state courts are equally competent to 
decide the question of whether the Jurisdictional Amendment divests state 
courts of jurisdiction over Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions.121 
The state court considered the issue further and issued an opinion 
agreeing with Knox’s analysis that “Congress intended . . . to divest state 
courts of concurrent jurisdiction over all covered class actions and that 
Congress enacted SLUSA to make Federal court the exclusive venue for 
securities class actions.”122  The state court therefore “f[ound] that it does 
not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Securities Act claims” 
and granted the defendants’ demurrer.123 
The plaintiffs appealed to the California Court of Appeals.  As the 
Knox court had before it, the appellate court focused on the Jurisdictional 
Amendment’s cross-reference to Section 16.124  But it began by rejecting 
Knox’s reading that the cross-reference refers to the definition of “covered 
class action” as set forth in Section 16(f), writing that the Securities Act’s 
Jurisdictional Provision, as amended by Jurisdictional Amendment: 
 
does not say that there is an exception to concurrent jurisdiction 
for all covered class actions.  Nor does it create its exception by 
referring to the definition of covered class action in section 
[Section 16](f)(2).  Instead, it refers to section [16] without 
limitation, and creates an exception to concurrent jurisdiction 
only as provided in section [16] “with respect to covered class 
actions.” 
In order to determine whether this case is exempted from the 
rule of concurrent jurisdiction, we must look to all of section 
 
 119.  See Luther III, 2009 WL 3271368, at *1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100138, at *5-6. 
 120.  See id. 
 121.  Id. at *3, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100138, at *10-13. 
 122.  Luther v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. BC380698, slip op. at 9 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
L.A. Cnty. Jan. 6, 2010) (Luther IV) (emphasis in original) (footnote and internal quotation 
marks omitted), rev’d, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (Luther V). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Luther V, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 719. 
ARTICLE 2 (LOWENTHAL & CHOE).DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/15  5:47 PM 
768 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
[16], and see what it provides “with respect to covered class 
actions.”125 
 
The Luther court then proceeded to go through each of the six 
subsections in Section 16 to see “what it provides ‘with respect to covered 
class actions.’”126  After doing so, however, the court came to the 
conclusion that none of them applied, writing that “[n]othing, then, in 
Section [16] describes this case, and thus nothing in section [16] puts this 
case into the exception to the rule of concurrent jurisdiction.”127  The court 
therefore held that the state court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
case and reversed the trial court’s dismissal.128 
2. Where The Luther Court Erred 
The Luther court goes no further, however, and thereby ignores the 
elephant in the room.  If SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment does not 
apply to the Luther case, to what category of cases does it apply?  If the 
Jurisdictional Amendment’s cross-reference to Section 16 does not refer to 
the definition of “covered class actions” in Section 16(f), to which part of 
Section 16 does it refer?  The Luther court provided no answer to these 
questions. 
The Luther opinion notes that courts cannot “read statutes in little 
bites”129 as the basis for rejecting Knox’s conclusion that the reference in 
SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment is to Section 16(f).  Thus, Luther 
argued, Congress could have been more specific (by explicitly referencing 
Section 16(f)), but it chose not to do so.  In other words, Luther resisted 
reading the cross-reference as only pointing to the definitional subsection 
of Section 16.  But Luther’s putative “big bite” reading of Section 16 
comes to the conclusion that none of Section 16’s other five subsections, 
either individually or taken together, bear on the meaning of SLUSA’s 
Jurisdictional Amendment either.  As such, that reading fails to exclude any 
identifiable category of actions from concurrent state court jurisdiction.130  
 
 125.  Id. at 719-20. 
 126.  Id. at 720. 
 127.  Id. at 721.  
 128.  Id. at 721, 723.  The defendants sought further review before both the California 
Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, but both petitions were denied.  Luther v. 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. S194319, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 9830 (Cal. Sept. 14, 2011) 
(denying petition for review); Countrywide Fin. Corp. v. Luther, 132 S. Ct. 832 (2011) 
(denying petition for writ of certiorari). 
 129.  Luther V, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720 (quoting Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 
U.S. 633, 643 (2006)). 
 130.  See id. at 721. 
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In light of Luther’s failure to offer an alternative explanation as to what the 
Jurisdictional Amendment’s cross-reference does refer, its statement that 
the cross-reference cannot refer to Section 16(f)’s definitional provisions is 
little more than ipse dixit. 
Courts are surely not compelled to adopt a construction of SLUSA’s 
Jurisdictional Amendment that gives it no legs.  There is an obvious 
explanation why Congress did not refer specifically to Subsection 16(f) in 
the Jurisdictional Amendment:  when the bill that was to become SLUSA 
was first introduced, there was no proposed Section 16(f) for the 
Jurisdictional Amendment to reference.  Statutory definitions are typically 
placed at the beginning or end of the statutory section in which they 
appear131; in Section 16, they were placed at the end.  As a result, as the bill 
was being drafted and revised, the subsection letter designation of the 
definitional provision kept changing, as amendments were added or 
deleted, affecting what the last subsection letter would be.  When the bill 
was first introduced, the definitions were set forth in Section 16(d), which 
at the time was the last section of the proposed new Section 16.132  As new 
subsections were added and removed, the definition subsection — which 
remained at the end — changed from being subsection (d) to (f)133 to (g)134 
to (f) again.135  The Jurisdictional Amendment’s reference to Section 16 as 
a whole and not Section 16(f) specifically is more likely a result of the 
drafting process than an indication that the cross-reference was not 
intended to refer to Section 16(f).  While the definition of “covered class 
actions” is set out in Section 16(f), by its terms it applies to all of Section 
16,136 and referring to Section 16 saved the Jurisdictional Amendment from 
having to be constantly revised upon each new iteration of the bill — and 
saves it from having to be revised should Congress decide in the future to 
add or remove other provisions from Section 16.137 
 
 131.  See DONALD HIRSCH, DRAFTING FEDERAL LAW 24 (2d ed. 1989) (explaining the 
ideal ordering of various aspects of legislation); U.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OFFICE OF 
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE 
23, 29 (1995); U.S. SENATE OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 
MANUAL 9 (1997) [hereinafter SENATE DRAFTING MANUAL]. 
 132.  S. 1260, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(d) (as introduced in Senate, Oct. 7, 1997). 
 133.  Id. § 3(a)(1)(f) (as reported in Senate, May 4, 1998). 
 134.  Id. § 3(a)(1)(g) (as passed by Senate, May 13, 1998). 
 135.  Id. § 101(a)(1)(f) (as passed by House, July 22, 1998). 
 136.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(f) (“For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall 
apply . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 137.  See SENATE DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 131, at 20, 24 (“DEFINED 
TERMS[:] . . . .  NO PARAGRAPH REFERENCE. — To eliminate the need to make 
conforming amendments that would be required if the paragraph (or other subdivision) 
designation of a defined term were changed by the amendment of a definitions provision, 
refer only to the definitions provision itself and not to the particular subdivision that 
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As Knox explained, the cross-reference is necessary because SLUSA’s 
Jurisdictional Amendment, and the Securities Act’s Jurisdictional Provision 
as a whole, do not define the term “covered class action.”138  That definition 
appears only in Section 16 and does not by its own terms apply to sections 
other than Section 16.139  Hence, the Jurisdictional Provision, which is 
located in Section 22(a), requires a cross-reference.140  While Luther 
attempts to reject Knox’s reasoning, it fails to offer any internally 
consistent alternative.  Instead, Luther attempts to distinguish Knox, 
arguing, for example, that “[t]he issue in Knox was removal . . . . [but t]his 
case cannot be removed because it does not concern covered securities,”141 
a reference to Section 16(c), which provides for removal only for cases 
involving covered securities.142  This is a mischaracterization:  Knox 
expressly refrained from offering any opinion on Section 16(c) or any of 
SLUSA’s removal amendments, deciding the case solely on the basis of 
jurisdiction and removal under the separate statutory provision 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(a).143  Additionally, Luther supports its holding by contending that 
 
contains the definition.”).  See generally Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 
122, 124 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting confusion where Congress promulgates statutes with 
cross-references to definitions in specific subsections and then fails to update cross-
references when statutes are amended); HIRSCH, supra note 131, at 17 (“[T]he renumbering 
or relettering of provisions of current law can create confusion.  If the redesignated 
provision is referred to in other laws, the drafter who fails to correct those references will 
mislead individuals using those other laws.”). 
 138.  See Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 139.  See id. (“Untethered from Section 16, the term ‘covered class action’ [in Section 
22] would be susceptible to differing interpretations.”); see also supra note 61 (discussing 
the inapplicability of the definition to other sections). 
 140.  See Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (“Construing [the Jurisdictional Amendment’s] 
reference [to Section 16] as a ‘guide’ makes sense because the phrase ‘covered class action’ 
is a term of art crafted by Congress.”); see also supra note 61.  Indeed, this cross-reference 
was all the more essential when the provision that would become SLUSA’s Jurisdictional 
Amendment was first drafted:  the original version of the bill used the term “class actions,” 
rather than “covered class actions,” S. 1260, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(d) (as introduced in 
Senate, Oct. 7, 1997), a term that already carries a meaning in federal law and in ordinary 
usage different from that in SLUSA, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (describing the requirements and 
types of class actions).  The cross-reference was therefore necessary to identify that the term 
“class action” in Section 22(a) was meant to be the term of art as it was defined in Section 
16, opposed to the more general definition of the term. 
 141.  Luther V, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 721.  By drawing this distinction, Luther never 
addressed the question of whether an Exclusively Federal Securities Class Action involving 
a covered security would be removable. 
 142.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(c).  SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment and the Securities Act’s 
Jurisdictional Provision, by contrast, never use the term “covered security.” 
 143.  See Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 421-23 (deciding removal based on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(a), not Section 16(c), “[b]ecause this Court holds that no state court has subject 
matter jurisdiction over covered class actions raising 1933 Act claims, [and] need not 
address the scope of the exception to the anti-removal provision”). 
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Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions cannot be removed, and “the 
fact that the case . . . cannot be removed to federal court if it is filed in state 
court, tells us that the state court has jurisdiction to hear the action.”144  But 
this argument, of course, is wholly circular — it simply assumes the very 
non-removability that it is trying to prove.  Luther conspicuously fails to 
explain what category of actions, if not Exclusively Federal Securities 
Class Actions, the Jurisdictional Amendment does eliminate from state 
court jurisdiction.  Rather, Luther threatens to construe this category as a 
null set and thereby nullify the Jurisdictional Amendment, in violation of 
the basic rules of statutory construction.145 
3. Luther’s Progeny, and How They Run Afoul of the Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust 
In the wake of the Luther decisions, several lower court opinions — 
Rajasekaran v. CytRx Corp.,146 City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief 
System v. MetLife, Inc.,147 Robinson v. Audience, Inc.,148 and Harper v. 
Smart Technologies, Inc.149 — have offered an alternative interpretation of 
the Jurisdictional Amendment’s cross-reference to Section 16.  These 
courts posit that the cross-reference is intended not to refer to Section 16(f) 
but to Section 16(b) (and the related Section 16(c), which cross-references 
Section 16(b)). 
As noted above, Section 16(b) defines a category of state law claims 
that plaintiffs are precluded from bringing in covered class actions relating 
to nationally traded securities.150  Section 16(c) allows for the removal of 
covered class actions involving a nationally traded security “as set forth in 
subsection (b).”151  These courts maintain that SLUSA’s Jurisdictional 
Amendment, through its cross-reference to Section 16, only strips state 
courts of jurisdiction over covered class actions that plead those state law 
 
 144.  Luther V, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 721. 
 145.  See supra notes 50-51 (analyzing fundamental rules of statutory construction). 
 146.  No. CV 14-3406-GHK (PJWx), 2014 WL 4330787, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
124550 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014). 
 147.  No. 2:12-cv-02626-HGD, 2013 WL 5526621, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147675 
(N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2013). 
 148.  No. 1:12-cv-232227, 2013 WL 2318459 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty. May 
28, 2013). 
 149.  No. 4:11-cv-05232-SBA, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012), ECF No. 42;  accord 
Layne v. Countrywide Financial Corp., Nos. BC389208, BC389332, slip op. (Cal. Super. 
Ct. L.A. Cnty. Feb. 5, 2010), available at 2010 WL 1637425 (Layne II), which was issued 
roughly contemporaneously with Luther IV, a year and a half before the Luther V appellate 
decision. 
 150.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(b); see supra Part II.C.2. 
 151.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(c); see supra Part II.C.3. 
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claims precluded by Section 16(b).  According to these courts, exclusively 
Federal Securities Class Actions, which by definition do not plead any state 
law claims, are consequently not excluded and remain subject to the 
Securities Act’s Removal Bar. 
Their reasoning for linking SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment with 
Sections 16(b) and 16(c) is this:  First, these courts generally agree — as 
they must — that the Jurisdictional Amendment had some effect, and 
therefore must have eliminated state court jurisdiction over some category 
of cases.152  These courts then look to Section 16 and see that Congress, in 
Section 16(b), barred certain claims by precluding their use in class actions 
(and in Section 16(c), allowed for removal of class actions “as set forth in 
subsection (b)”).153  From there, these courts then make the inferential leap 
that the category of claims and actions that Congress precluded in Section 
16(b) and allowed for removal in Section 16(c) must be the same as the 
category of class actions for which Congress eliminated state court 
jurisdiction in the Jurisdictional Amendment.154  But the text of the 
 
 152.  MetLife, 2013 WL 5526621, at *4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147675, at *14 (“The 
newly-added language in [Section 22] provides that with some category of cases, concurrent 
state jurisdiction will no longer be available.”); Robinson, 2013 WL 2318459, at *3 
(implicitly recognizing that the Jurisdictional Amendment must eliminate some category of 
cases from concurrent state court jurisdiction); Harper, slip op. at 8-9 (same); see also 
Layne II, slip op. at 8 (“The plain language of [Section 22] indicates that there is some 
subset of cases or claims brought under the subchapter [the Securities Act] over which state 
courts no longer have concurrent jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 153.  MetLife, 2013 WL 5526621, at *4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147675, at *15 (“While 
[Section 22] does not specify the type of 1933 Act cases for which state courts will no 
longer have concurrent jurisdiction, it does refer the reader to [Section 16] for clarification. 
Specifically [Section 16](c) states . . . .  Furthermore, [Section 16](b) indicates . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); Robinson, 2013 WL 2318459, at *3 (“[I]n interpreting the jurisdiction 
provision of Section 22(a), the Court cannot focus exclusively on the generic definitional 
portion of Section 16 (subd. (f)), but properly looks to the portions of Section 16 (subds. (b) 
and (c)) that actually involve divesting state courts of jurisdiction . . . through the process of 
removal.”) (emphasis added); Harper, slip op. at 9 (“[T]he starting point for determining 
whether an action is subject to the exception is determined by reference to section [16], not 
solely whether the action is a covered class action.  Section [16] contains the SLUSA’s 
preclusion provision . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Layne II, slip op. at 8 (“[T]he text of 
[Section 22] . . . refers the reader to [Section 16] . . . .  That section contains a provision 
entitled ‘Class Action Limitations,’ . . . .”). 
 154.  Rajasekaran v. CytRx Corp., No. CV 14-3406-GHK (PJWx), 2014 WL 4330787, at 
*5, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124550, at *12-13 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014) (“[O]f all of the 
provisions [in Section 16], only subsection (b) imposes any jurisdictional limitations, and 
even still, those limitations apply only to class actions ‘based upon the statutory or common 
law of any State.’”); MetLife, 2013 WL 5526621, at *4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147675, at 
*15 (generally same); Robinson, 2013 WL 2318459, at *3 (generally same); Harper, slip 
op. at 10 (“[T]he Court finds that the SLUSA’s revision to [the Jurisdictional Provision] 
does not vest federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over any and all covered class 
actions.  Rather, the exception to concurrent jurisdiction only applies to precluded actions; 
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Jurisdictional Amendment, and the Securities Act’s Jurisdictional 
Provision, address only federal law claims, not the state law claims 
described in Section 16(b).155  Moreover, the approach taken by these 
courts has been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in Kircher v. 
Putnam Funds Trust,156 where the Court held that, under SLUSA, state 
courts retain subject-matter jurisdiction of these actions and claims. 
Kircher involved eight separate putative class actions alleging state 
law claims filed in Illinois state court by eight groups of investors in a 
mutual fund, each of which sought to represent a class of investors 
allegedly injured by the devaluation of their holdings.157  The defendants 
 
that is, a covered class action that also meets all the requirements of section [16](b).”) 
(citations omitted); accord Layne II, slip op. at 8-9 (“[I]t was Congress’s intent to eliminate 
concurrent state court jurisdiction over only those cases that fall under the specific class 
action limitation of [Section 16] — covered class actions brought under state law.” (citing 
Section 16(b))).  These courts, like Luther, claim that the Jurisdictional Amendment’s 
reference to Section 16 cannot refer to the definitional provisions in Section 16(f), see 
Robinson, 2013 WL 2318459, at *3 (citing Luther V, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 719-20); accord 
Layne II, slip op. at 7 — but conspicuously do not address the fact that the Jurisdictional 
Amendment does not explicitly refer to Sections 16(b) or 16(c) any more than it does to 
Section 16(f). 
 155.  Another opinion, Niitsoo v. Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 2d 797 
(S.D. W. Va. 2012), similarly tried to link the Jurisdictional Amendment to Section 16(b) 
but recognized that doing so was inconsistent with the language of the Securities Act’s 
Jurisdictional Provision that it amended, as the Jurisdictional Provision only address federal 
claims and Section 16(b) only addresses state claims.  See id. at 805 (“None of [Section 
16]’s four substantive subsections discuss federal law at all — subsections (b), (d), and (e) 
all deal indisputably with state law class actions, and do not have anything to do with 
concurrent jurisdiction over federal securities class actions ‘under this subchapter.’  Under 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation, subsection (c) also deals only with state law class 
actions.”) (emphasis in original).  The Niitsoo court’s solution was to simply ignore the fact 
that the Jurisdictional Provision only refers to federal securities claims, see id. (“I have no 
problem treating [the Jurisdictional Provision’s reference to federal claims] as unintentional 
and superfluous.  Congress’s failure to excise those words was inadvertent.”), in order to be 
able to shoehorn upon it the court’s reading that the Jurisdictional Amendment only 
eliminates jurisdiction of state law claims.  Not only does this interpretation violate basic 
tenets of statutory construction, see, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611 
(1989) (“[I]nterpretative canons are not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language 
enacted by the legislature.” (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1989))) 
(internal brackets omitted), but removing the reference to federal securities claims in the 
Jurisdictional Provision also transforms it into a provision that grants federal courts 
jurisdiction over every civil action — “[t]he district courts of the United States and the 
United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under 
this subchapter and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in 
respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, except as provided in 
section [16] of this title with respect to covered class actions, of all suits in equity and 
actions at law,” period, see 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) — a result that is patently nonsensical. 
 156.  547 U.S. 633 (2006). 
 157.  Id. at 637. 
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removed the actions to federal court under Section 16(c).158  The plaintiffs 
moved to remand the cases, arguing that the removal provisions of Section 
16(c) were limited to the cases set forth in Section 16(b), i.e., state law 
claims in connection with the purchase and sale of a covered security, and 
asserted that their actions, which involved only “holder” claims with no 
allegations of “purchases” or “sales,” fell outside the scope of Section 
16(b).159  The district court sided with the plaintiffs, holding that plaintiffs’ 
“holder” claims were not within the scope of the claims listed in Section 
16(b) and therefore were not removable under Section 16(c).160  As there 
was no other basis for exercising federal jurisdiction — the cases, which 
pleaded only state law claims, presented no federal question, and 
additionally were not subject to diversity jurisdiction161 — the district court 
remanded the cases to state court. 
The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit.  Before reviewing the 
case, however, the Seventh Circuit was faced with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), 
which provides, generally speaking, that orders remanding cases to state 
courts are not reviewable on appeal, no matter how erroneous that order 
might be.162  The Seventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) did not 
apply and — to satisfy itself that this holding made “practical sense” —  
further reasoned that SLUSA establishes that only federal courts can 
adjudicate whether Section 16(b) precludes a state law claim, and that, as 
the federal appellate court, it had to review the district court’s opinion on 
Section 16(b) preclusion, a major substantive issue in the case, as the issue 
would otherwise be unreviewable.163  The Seventh Circuit therefore took 
 
 158.  See id. 
 159.  See id. at 637-38.  The Supreme Court held in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 88-89 (2006), that “holder” state law claims are also subject to 
Section 16(b) preclusion under SLUSA, but this decision had not yet been issued at the time 
of the district court proceedings in Kircher.  See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 638 n.5, 645. 
 160.  See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 638. 
 161.  See id. at 637, 641-42 & n.10.  
 162.  See id. at 640-41 (“[W]here the [remand] order is based on one of the grounds 
enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error 
in ordering the remand.” (quoting Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 413-14 n.13 (1977))) 
(internal brackets omitted).  As an aside, in addition to express statutory exceptions to this 
general rule that allow for appellate review of remand orders of cases removed pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 or 1443, appellate courts may review remand orders if the remand order 
was based on grounds unrelated to those set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).  See Thermtron 
Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351-52 (1976).   
 163.  See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 639 (“To satisfy itself that its decision [to hear defendants’ 
appeal] made ‘practical sense,’ the [Seventh Circuit] proposed that [SLUSA] reserves to the 
Federal Judiciary the exclusive authority to make the preclusion decision.  Treating remand 
orders in this context as immunized from appeal by § 1447(d) would thus mean that ‘a 
major substantive issue in the case would escape review,’ since it would not be open to 
resolution in the state court subject to review by this Court.” (citing Kircher v. Putnam 
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the appeal and, on the merits, held that “holder” claims fall within Section 
16(b) and therefore are removable.164 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  It held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) 
applied and that the Seventh Circuit therefore had no power to review the 
district court’s remand order.165  In doing so, the Supreme Court also 
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s notion that only federal courts have 
jurisdiction over cases alleging claims set forth in Section 16(b).  To the 
contrary, it expressly held that “nothing in [SLUSA] gives the federal 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over preclusion decisions” under Section 
16(b).166  Rather, state courts were “equally competent bod[ies] to make the 
preclusion determination.”167  In reversing the Seventh Circuit and 
reinstating the district court’s original decision to remand the case, the 
Supreme Court thus left the question of Section 16(b) preclusion entirely in 
the hands of the state court, trusting the state court — an equally competent 
body — to properly apply Section 16(b) and make the preclusion 
determination.168  The Rajasekaran, MetLife, Robinson and Harper courts’ 
conclusion that the actions over which the Jurisdictional Amendment 
eliminates state court jurisdiction is the category of actions asserting state 
law claims precluded in Section 16(b) is therefore decidedly wrong — 
Kircher establishes that these are precisely the actions over which state 
courts retain jurisdiction.169 
 
Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2004))). 
 164.  See id. (“The Seventh Circuit subsequently consolidated the funds’ appeals and 
decided on the merits, that [SLUSA] does preclude the investors’ claims.” (citing Kircher v. 
Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2005))). 
 165.  See id. at 640-41. 
 166.  Id. at 646. 
 167.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 168.  See id. at 646-48 (“[T]he [defendants] can presently . . . ask for dismissal on 
grounds of [Section 16(b)] preclusion when they return to the state court. . . .  [W]e have no 
reason to doubt that the state court will duly apply [applicable law] . . . .”). 
 169.  The reasoning that the Rajasekaran and Harper courts offer, for example — that 
“[t]he most natural, straightforward reading of [Sections 16(b) and Section 16(c)] is that 
only covered class actions based upon state law. . . can be removed to federal court, and 
only for the purpose of dismissing the precluded state law claims” and that “[Section 16](b) 
imposes . . . jurisdictional limitations,” Rajasekaran v. CytRx Corp., No. CV 14-3406-GHK 
(PJWx), 2014 WL 4330787, at *3, *5, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124550, at *8, *12 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 21, 2014), or that “SLUSA makes precluded actions [as set forth in Section 16(b)] 
removable to ensure that they are not litigated in state court, and that federal courts are the 
sole arbiter of whether an action is precluded,” Harper v. Smart Techs., Inc., No. 4:11-cv-
05232-SBA, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012), ECF No. 42 (citations omitted) — is 
precisely the same as the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that the Supreme Court rejected in 
Kircher.  See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 645-46 (“The Seventh Circuit’s reading of subsection (c) 
so as to treat the application of the preclusion rule as nonjurisdictional was in part motivated 
by its assumption that the Act gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to decide the 
preclusion issue. . . . But . . . nothing in [SLUSA] gives the federal courts exclusive 
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Fundamentally, the central error that these courts make is improperly 
equating the concepts of preclusion and removal with the separate concept 
of jurisdiction.170  They are decidedly distinct.  The fact that an action may 
be removable does not mean that a state court lacks jurisdiction over the 
action.171  Likewise, the fact that a claim may be precluded does not mean 
that a court lacks jurisdiction over the claim.172  As the Supreme Court held, 
defendants remain free to move in state court for dismissal of their claims 
on the grounds of SLUSA preclusion (or, if they wish, to litigate their 
claims on the merits).173  SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment is not a 
restatement of Section 16(b)’s preclusion provision or Section 16(c)’s 
removal provision, and the category of class actions the Jurisdictional 
Amendment excludes from state court jurisdiction is not the same as the 
category of claims precluded by Section 16(b) or the category of actions 
removable under Section 16(c).174 
We are therefore left in the same place we were after Luther:  
SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment eliminates state court jurisdiction over 
some category of class actions “brought to enforce any liability or duty 
created by [the Securities Act].”175  No court has been able to explain how 
— without violating Kircher — the category of actions excluded from state 
 
jurisdiction over preclusion decisions.”).  Cases like Rajasekaran and Harper also cite 
dictum from a Ninth Circuit case, Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 
2009), which purports that “SLUSA authorizes defendants to remove such actions to federal 
court, effectively ensuring that federal courts will have the opportunity to determine whether 
a state action is precluded” — but this dictum cannot stand in the face of Kircher’s holding 
that state courts may in fact decide preclusion issues as well. 
 170.  Robinson exemplifies this confusion, characterizing subsections 16(b) and (c) as 
“divesting state courts of jurisdiction . . . through the process of removal,” wholly conflating 
the two concepts.  Robinson v. Audience, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-232227, 2013 WL 2318459, at 
*3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty. May 28, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 171.  For example, an action between diverse parties alleging state law claims for more 
than $75,000 is removable to federal court, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a), but the state 
court retains jurisdiction over these types of actions. 
 172.  See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 646 (noting that Section 16(b) precludes certain class 
actions from going forward but that state courts retain jurisdiction over them); see also, e.g., 
Domnister v. Exclusive Ambulette, Inc., 607 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court 
must have subject-matter jurisdiction in order to dismiss a case based on either issue or 
claim preclusion.”) (emphasis added); Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 
2008) (“[I]ssue preclusion relates to the question of when a federal court may decline to 
hear a matter of dispute within its jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added). 
 173.  See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 646. 
 174.  Among other things, reading SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment as covering the 
exact same category of actions as those set out in Sections 16(b) and 16(c) runs afoul of the 
fundamental precept of statutory interpretation that “legislative enactments should not be 
construed to render their provisions mere surplusage.”  See, e.g., Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 
465, 472 (1997). 
 175.  15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). 
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court jurisdiction could not include Exclusively Federal Securities Class 
Actions.  The only interpretation that is consistent with Kircher is the one 
set forth in Knox:  namely, that Exclusively Federal Securities Class 
Actions are included in this category of actions for which the Jurisdictional 
Amendment eliminates state court jurisdiction, and such actions are 
therefore not subject to the Removal Bar and can be removed under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a).176 
IV. INTERPRETING SLUSA’S JURISDICTIONAL AMENDMENT IN LIGHT 
OF THE PRECEPTS OF FEDERALISM 
This conclusion is further compelled by the demands of federalism. 
As discussed above, even Knox’s detractors acknowledge that 
SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment divested state courts of jurisdiction 
over some category of covered class actions that allege Securities Act 
claims.177  If one were to assume that this category does not include 
covered class actions that allege solely Securities Act claims, then by 
definition it must include a category of covered class actions that allege 
Securities Act claims together with state law claims.  Under this 
hypothetical, state courts retain jurisdiction over covered class actions that 
allege only federal Securities Act claims — but lose jurisdiction if state 
claims are brought along with the federal claims, by virtue of the presence 
of state claims.  As such, state courts are stripped of jurisdiction over 
covered class actions based on their states’ own laws, while they retain 
jurisdiction of those that are not.  This presents concerns of a constitutional 
dimension. 
In general, “[t]he States . . . have great latitude to establish the 
structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.”178  The Supreme Court has 
never endorsed the practice of stripping state courts of jurisdiction over 
their own state law,179 and as one commentator notes, “[t]he Supreme Court 
has at least suggested that states generally have a constitutional interest in 
enforcing their own laws against individuals over whom they 
constitutionally may exercise jurisdiction.”180  Consequently, an 
 
 176.  Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f) makes clear that removal is proper even where “the 
State court from which such civil action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that 
claim.” 
 177.  See supra note 152 (MetLife, Robinson, Harper, and Layne II recognizing that the 
Jurisdictional Amendment eliminated some category of cases from state court jurisdiction). 
 178.  Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919 (1997) (quoting Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. 
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990)). 
 179.  See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 
GEO. L.J. 949, 1006-09 (2006). 
 180.  Id. at 1008. 
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interpretation of the Jurisdictional Amendment that would divest state 
courts of jurisdiction over claims based on their state law is highly 
questionable.181  Rather than presume that Congress acted in an 
unprecedented manner to enact a questionable policy of stripping state 
courts of concurrent jurisdiction over their own state law, the better reading 
of the Jurisdictional Amendment is that it strips state courts of jurisdiction 
over Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions — an act that is plainly 
within Congress’s power.182  As the Supreme Court has stated, “the 
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect 
federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that 
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States,”183 and 
in construing the Jurisdictional Amendment, courts should do so in a way 
so as “not to interfere with a state court’s legitimate exercise of its own 
jurisdiction.”184 
 
 181.  It might be a different question had SLUSA preempted the field of securities 
regulation.  Congress would have been well within its authority to preempt state securities 
laws.  See, e.g., Georgene Vario, Judicial v. Congressional Federalism:  The Implication of 
the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1559, 1606 (2000).  But SLUSA is not a “preemption provision” and “does not 
itself displace state law with federal law”; rather, all that SLUSA does with respect to state 
law claims is to “make[] some state-law claims nonactionable through the class-action 
device in federal as well as state court.”  See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 
636 n.1 (2006) (emphasis added).  Professor Vario argues that even allowing removal of 
state law claims may present federalism concerns (although she concludes in the end that 
allowing removal is constitutional).  See Vario, supra, at 1606-07, 1615-16 (noting while it 
is within Congress’s power to preempt state remedies, removing cases to federal court to 
curtail state remedies is unusual and a cause for federalism concerns).  And removal is 
optional; a defendant can decide not to remove and “elect to leave a case where the plaintiff 
filed it” in state court.  Kircher, 547 U.S. at 634.  Subject-matter jurisdiction, however, 
cannot be conferred by the parties.  An interpretation of SLUSA’s Jurisdictional 
Amendment that a state court can hear an Exclusively Federal Securities Class Action but 
cannot hear the same action if a state law claim is added, even with the consent of the 
parties, is, a fortiori, is all the more constitutionally suspect. 
 182.  See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 758 (2009) (“[W]here a right arises 
under a law of the United States, Congress may, if it sees fit, give to the Federal Courts 
exclusive jurisdiction.” (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876))) 
(internal brackets omitted). 
 183.  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
 184.  See Enrique Schaerer, A Rose By Any Other Name:  Why a Parens Patriae Action 
Can Be a Mass Action Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUBLIC 
POL’Y 39, 84 (2013) (citing Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 431 (2010)); 
see also Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1068 (2014) (“Under 
numerous provisions, [SLUSA] purposefully maintains state legal authority, especially over 
matters that are primarily of state concern.”). 
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V.   INTERPRETING SLUSA’S JURISDICTIONAL AMENDMENT IN LIGHT 
OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE PSLRA 
AND SLUSA 
The legislative history of the PSLRA and SLUSA further supports the 
conclusion that Congress, in enacting SLUSA, intended all securities cases 
using the class action device, including Exclusively Federal Securities 
Class Actions, to be litigated in the federal courts.185 
Congress expressly set forth SLUSA’s goals at the start of the Act: 
 
(1) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
sought to prevent abuses in private securities fraud lawsuits; 
(2) since enactment of that legislation, considerable 
evidence has been presented to Congress that a number of 
securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State 
courts; 
(3) this shift has prevented that Act from fully achieving its 
objectives; 
(4) State securities regulation is of continuing importance, 
together with Federal regulation of securities, to protect investors 
and promote strong financial markets; and 
(5) in order to prevent certain State private securities class 
action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the 
objectives of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, it is appropriate to enact national standards for securities 
class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while 
preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State securities 
regulators and not changing the current treatment of individual 
lawsuits.186 
 
The legislative history leading up to the enactment of SLUSA further 
confirms that Congress intended to have all securities class actions litigated 
in federal court and understood its remedies to apply to such class actions 
generally, without an exception for Exclusively Federal Securities Class 
Actions.  The Senate subcommittee introducing the bill that would become 
SLUSA characterized it as “basically say[ing] that for class action suits, 
 
 185.  While there is no discussion in the legislative history that focuses specifically on 
SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment or the Securities Act’s Jurisdictional Provision, the 
legislative history of SLUSA as a whole makes clear that Congress intended securities class 
actions to be litigated in federal court. 
 186.  Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112 
Stat. 3227, 3227. 
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and class action suits only, where you are dealing with a stock that is traded 
nationally, so there is clearly an overriding national interest, that those suits 
have to be filed in Federal court.”187  No exception was made for 
Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions.  The House committee that 
reported on the bill similarly stated that SLUSA’s intent was to “make 
Federal court the exclusive venue for securities fraud class action 
litigation,”188 without noting any exceptions.  Likewise, the joint 
House/Senate conference committee explained that “[t]he purpose of 
[SLUSA] is to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to evade the protections that 
Federal law provides against abusive litigation by filing suit in State, rather 
than in Federal, court,”189 again without noting any exceptions.  Statements 
of members of Congress during the debates further evidence this shared 
understanding that “[SLUSA] would in effect require that every large 
securities class action be brought into federal court.”190  Commentators 
reviewing the legislation as it was pending before Congress expressed the 
same contemporaneous understanding.191  Even witnesses who testified 
before Congress to oppose SLUSA’s enactment and who argued that 
securities class actions alleging state law claims should be allowed to 
remain in state court agreed that class actions alleging claims under the 
federal securities laws should only proceed in federal court.192 
Those who oppose the removal of Exclusively Federal Securities 
Class Actions to federal court correctly note that one of Congress’s 
 
 187.  S. Subcomm. 1997 SLUSA Hearing, supra note 45, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. 
Phil Gramm, Chairman, Subcomm. on Sec. of S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban 
Affairs). 
 188.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998). 
 189.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998). 
 190.  144 CONG. REC. S4778-03, at S4797 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) 
(emphasis added); accord H. Subcomm. SLUSA Hearing, supra note 27, at 1 (statement of 
Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman, Comm. on Commerce) (“This legislation makes Federal court 
the exclusive venue for securities class actions.  In this way, the trial bar will not be able to 
use State court as a means of evading the changes of the [PSLRA].”); id. at 4 (statement of 
Rep. Rick White) (“What [SLUSA] is all about is simply to realize the intent of the 
[PSLRA].  It does that by making sure that class action suits with securities that are traded 
on the three major securities trading exchanges in our country have to be subject to the rules 
that we passed last time [in the PSLRA] and have to go to Federal court.”). 
 191.  See Perino, supra note 28, at 335 (writing in 1998 that the pending bill that would 
become SLUSA, as well as two other alternative bills, “[a]ll . . . eliminate concurrent state 
jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims in favor of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts”). 
 192.  See H. Subcomm. SLUSA Hearing, supra note 27, at 118 (statements of Rep. Rick 
White and Richard Painter, Professor, Cornell University Law School) (“MR. WHITE.  Let 
me ask you one other question, just to understand your point that really it’s better to let State 
courts decide some of these issues.  I take it you wouldn’t support turning the 1934 or 1933 
Federal securities act claims over to State courts.  I mean, there is a place for a national 
standard, I take it, at least in some areas.  MR. PAINTER.  Well, yes.”). 
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objectives in enacting SLUSA was to preclude certain state law claims “to 
limit the conduct of securities class actions under State law.”193  But the 
fact that this was one of Congress’s multiple objectives — one it achieved 
by promulgating Section 16(b) in SLUSA § 101(a)(1) — does not mean 
that Congress did not also intend to divest state courts of concurrent 
subject-matter jurisdiction over securities class actions under federal law — 
a separate goal that Congress achieved by promulgating the separate 
Jurisdictional Amendment in SLUSA § 101(a)(3)(A).  Had Congress 
intended to enact the paradoxical result that these opponents claim — that 
while securities class actions that allege state law claims are removable to 
federal court, class actions that allege only federal law claims must remain 
in state court — one would expect it to have been mentioned somewhere in 
the legislative record.194  Yet nowhere in the record does any Senator or 
Representative ever make any such mention or evidence any understanding 
that SLUSA was intended to achieve this illogical result.195 
This is unsurprising.  In the seventeen years since SLUSA has been 
enacted, not a single court or commentator has been able to offer a cogent 
reason for why Congress would have enacted a system in which securities 
class actions that allege state law claims can be removed to federal court, 
but class actions that allege only federal law claims should be consigned to 
state court.196  Instead, they are forced to concede that this result makes no 
sense.  As one court noted in 2007: 
 
 193.  H.R. Rep. 105-640, at 1 (1998). 
 194.  See Snyder, supra note 8, at 695 (“[N]owhere did a Senator note an exemption 
from the removal authority for class actions alleging violations of only the Securities Act.  
Such an awkward exception to the implementation of ‘federal standards’ would surely have 
been mentioned.”). 
 195.  See id.; cf. Costa, supra note 8, at 1219-20 (arguing that SLUSA allows for 
Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions to be brought in state court and bars their 
removal to federal court, but being forced to acknowledge that “there are statements 
elsewhere in SLUSA’s legislative history that tend to support removal” and that “[r]emoval 
would help eliminate the possibility that the effectiveness of federal securities class action 
reform would be undermined by inconsistent state court adjudications of federal claims”). 
 196.  One commentator speculates that the Republican majority in Congress at the time 
SLUSA was enacted “was generally concerned with federalism, and with ‘returning 
authority to the states.’”  This commentator argues that this Republican Congress supported 
passing SLUSA with a provision that allowed for removal of class actions with state law 
claims but would not have supported allowing removal of Exclusively Federal Securities 
Class Actions, as “contract[ing] the authority of the state judiciary in favor of augmenting 
that of the federal judiciary was unpopular in th[at] political climate.”  See Costa, supra note 
8, at 1222-23 (arguing that Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions should proceed in 
state courts).  This argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the legislative 
environment surrounding SLUSA’s passage.  Congressional Republicans, including “states’ 
rights” Republicans, were the ones who were more strongly in favor of shifting securities 
and class action litigation from state courts to federal court in SLUSA, as they were with the 
PSLRA three years earlier and CAFA seven years later.  See Vario, supra note 181, at 1561, 
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[G]iven the intent of SLUSA, it just makes no sense to prohibit 
the removal of federal securities class actions to federal court.  
Such a prohibition would permit the sort of end run around the 
PSLRA that SLUSA attempted to stop.  It is inconceivable to me 
that the drafters of the Act intended such an outcome. 
. . . . Certainly, Congress’s desire to create a unified national 
standard for securities class actions cannot be met if fifty 
different state jurisdictions now become the official, and perhaps 
exclusive, interpreters of a federal statute. . . . 
Further, . . . the result will also create a tremendous burden 
on state-court systems that are already beleaguered with heavy 
dockets and scarce resources. . . .  [State] courts will be tasked 
with mastering a very specialized and complex area of federal 
law in which they traditionally have had no experience.  By 
requiring state courts to interpret this federal law and to preside 
over cases brought pursuant to it, Congress will have imposed an 
enormous unfunded mandate on these courts to do the work that 
Congress should have its own courts do.197 
 
In short, the legislative history and purpose of SLUSA strongly 
supports the argument that Congress intended to include Exclusively 
Federal Securities Class Actions in SLUSA’s remedies, and nothing in the 
legislative history evidences a clear intent to exclude them, nor would such 
exclusion make any sense in light of SLUSA’s overall purpose:  to prevent 
plaintiffs from circumventing the PSLRA. 
VI.     THE CONFUSION OVER SECTION 16(C) 
As noted above, there is a continuing split in the case law regarding 
the treatment of Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions.  As Knox 
explains, the proper way to address this question is to determine whether 
state courts can retain jurisdiction over Exclusively Federal Securities Class 
Actions after SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment; if they do not, such 
 
1606 (remarking on the apparent irony of Republican states’ rights legislators consistently 
supporting SLUSA and its expansion of federal jurisdiction over state court claims).  
Additionally, this commentator’s reading — that cases alleging state law, as opposed to 
Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions, are the ones that should be removed from state 
courts — is actually the reading that is more offensive to federalism.  See supra Part IV. 
 197.  Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 1:06-CV-02391-JEC, 2007 WL 2729011, at *9-
10, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at *28-31 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007) (citations omitted).  
Notwithstanding the above, the Unschuld court reluctantly remanded the case before it 
based on a misunderstanding of Kircher, as discussed below.  See infra Part VI. 
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actions are removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  While Luther and its 
progeny split from Knox in this interpretation — and, as described above, 
these cases cannot offer a logically coherent alternative without running 
roughshod over the Supreme Court’s holding in Kircher198 — they at least 
address the correct issue on the merits. 
But many cases fail to address this issue at all.  Indeed, the main cause 
of this conflict within the case law is not a debate over Knox’s or Luther’s 
interpretation of SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment; it is the fact that the 
majority of courts do not ask the jurisdictional question at all.  Instead, they 
have focused on the wrong provision of SLUSA — the separate 
Section 101(a)(3)(B) (the “Removal Bar Amendment”) — which amended 
the Securities Act’s Removal Bar to read: “Except as provided in section 
77p(c) of this title [Section 16(c) of the Securities Act], no case arising 
under this subchapter and brought in any State court of competent 
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.”199 
The assumption underlying the focus on the Removal Bar Amendment 
is this:  many courts simply assume that the Removal Bar applies to all 
actions alleging Securities Act claims, without recognizing that the 
Removal Bar applies only to cases brought in state courts “of competent 
jurisdiction.”200  These courts therefore jump straight to examining the new 
exception that the Removal Bar Amendment adds without first asking 
whether the Removal Bar applies to begin with.  The Removal Bar 
Amendment has a cross-reference to Section 16(c), and Section 16(c) in 
turn cross-references Section 16(b).  Many courts therefore simply begin 
and end their analysis on these two sections.  The fixation on Sections 
16(b) and 16(c) has led to considerable confusion. 
The first two courts to address this issue in connection with 
Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions immediately disagreed over 
what Sections 16(c) allows.  The first held that the Removal Bar 
Amendment and Section 16(c) permitted the removal of Exclusively 
Federal Securities Class Actions,201 before reversing itself sua sponte three 
weeks later to hold that Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions are 
not removable under Section 16(c).202  The second held that Exclusively 
Federal Securities Class Actions are in fact removable under Section 
 
 198.  See supra Part III.C. 
 199.  15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (language added by SLUSA’s Removal Bar Amendment 
emphasized). 
 200.  See, e.g., Luther I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *10; Luther II, 533 F.3d at 
1033.   
 201.  Miller v. Waste Mgmt., Inc. (In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig.), No. H-01-4381, 
2002 WL 32107927, at *1, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3460, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2002) 
(Miller I), rev’d on reconsideration, 194 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (Miller II). 
 202.  Miller II, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
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16(c).203  A multitude of subsequent courts further perpetuated this chaos.204  
And because these decisions were not appealable, due to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(d), no appellate court was able to resolve this profound 
disagreement among the lower courts.205 
 
 203.  Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 204.  Compare Bernd Bildstein IRRA v. Lazard Ltd., No. 05 CV 3388 RJDRML, 2006 
WL 2375472, at *1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61395, at *2-4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) 
(holding removal is impermissible under Section 16(c)), Pipefitters Local 522 & 633 
Pension Trust Fund v. Salem Commc’ns Corp., No. CV 05-2730-RGK (MCx), 2005 WL 
6963459, at *2-3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14202, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2005) (same), 
Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., Nos. 04 C 4909, 04 C 7906, 2005 WL 1272271, at *2-3, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12006, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2005) (same), Zia v. Med. Staffing 
Network, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308-10 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (same), Steamfitters Local 
449 Pension & Ret. Sec. Funds v. Quality Distribution, Inc., No. 8:04-cv-961-T-26MAP, 
2004 WL 6246913, at *2, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32014, at *5-6 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2004) 
(same), In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121-22 (D.N.H. 2004) (same), Williams 
v. AFC Enters., Inc., No. CIVA 103-CV-2490-TWT, 2003 WL 24100302 at *2-4, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28623, at *6-10 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 20, 2003) (Williams I) (same, although 
noting that this result “just makes no sense”), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 389 
F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2004) (Williams II), Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund 
v. Calpine Corp., No. 03CV0714BTM(JFS), 2003 WL 23509312, at *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15832, at *4-6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2003) (same, although noting that “there are 
statements of members of Congress that are consistent with an intent to authorize the 
removal of all covered class actions involving covered securities . . . including class actions 
arising under the Securities Act”) (emphasis added), Martin v. BellSouth Corp., No. 1:03-
CV-728-WBH, 2003 WL 26476752, at *2-3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28605, at *5-8 (N.D. 
Ga. July 3, 2003) (same), and Nauheim v. Interpublic Grp. of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 
WL 1888843, at *3, 5, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *10-11, 17 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003) 
(same, holding that the Removal Bar “prohibit[s] removal of any ‘case arising under this 
subchapter and brought in any State court . . . except as provided in section [16](c) of this 
title’” and holding removal impermissible under Section 16(c), while overtly ignoring the 
Removal Bar’s “of competent jurisdiction” limitation) (ellipsis and omission in original), 
with Purowitz v. DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., No. CV 05-6090 MRP (VBKx), 2005 
WL 6794770, at *2-3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46911, at *5-7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2005) 
(holding removal permissible under Section 16(c)), Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 3:05CV316-
H, 2005 WL 2592229, at *4, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44720, at *10-13 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 
2005) (same), In re King Pharm., Inc. 230 F.R.D. 503, 504-05 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (same), 
Kulinski v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., No. C-2-03-412, 2003 WL 24032299, at *1, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26447, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2013) (report and recommendation) 
(same), adopted, slip op. (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2004), ECF No. 31, and Alkow v. TXU Corp., 
No. 3:02-2738-K, 3:02-CV-2379-K, 2003 WL 21056750, at *2-3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7900, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003) (same).  Commentators similarly focused on Section 
16(c) and were no less split.  Compare Costa, supra note 8, at 1216-17 (focusing on Section 
16(c) and arguing that removal is impermissible), with Cook, supra note 24, at 647-52 
(focusing on Section 16(c) and arguing that removal is permissible).  
 205.  See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640-42 (“[W]here the [remand] 
order is based on one of the grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), review is 
unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand.” (quoting Briscoe v. 
Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 413-14 n.13 (1977))) (internal brackets omitted); Williams II, 389 F.3d 
at 1191 (dismissing appeal of Williams I for want of jurisdiction, as “[t]he district court’s 
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Ironically, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kircher only worsened the 
confusion.  As described above, Kircher’s central holding is that state 
courts retain jurisdiction over the state claims described in Section 16(b).206  
But not a single case examining the removability of Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions has ever focused on Kircher’s jurisdictional 
holding.  Numerous courts have instead fixated a passage of dictum in 
Kircher that addresses removability under Section 16(c) and suggests that 
the only actions removable under Section 16(c) are those with claims 
precluded by Section 16(b), i.e., state law claims.207  But which actions are 
removable under Section 16(c) is irrelevant to Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions because they are removable under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(a) and hence have no need of Section 16(c).208  Nonetheless, 
subsequent courts began erroneously using the dictum in Kircher to decide 
whether Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions, which by definition 
 
interpretation of SLUSA, erroneous or not, is not reviewable under § 1447(d)”) (citations 
omitted). 
 206.  See supra Part III.C.3. 
 207.  See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 643-44 (“[S]ubsection (c) is understood to be restricted to 
precluded actions defined by subsection (b) . . . .  If the action is not precluded, the federal 
court likewise has no jurisdiction to touch the case on the merits, and the proper course is to 
remand to the state court that can deal with it.”).  But this passage was not directed to 
Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions.  Rather, it was addressed to actions alleging 
only state law claims for which there was no basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction 
other than SLUSA.  See id. at 637, 641-42 & n.10 (holding that there was no other ground, 
e.g., diversity, for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the actions at issue).  If the only 
possible basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction of a purely state law claim is in SLUSA 
and Sections 16(b) and 16(c), then only those actions that fall within the scope of those 
subsections can be removed to federal court, as the federal court would otherwise have no 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  On the other hand, actions for which there is a separate and 
independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction, such as claims under the federal 
securities laws, and which can be removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), do not depend on 
SLUSA for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.  Further, as Justice Scalia points out, this 
passage in Kircher is properly understood as dictum even with respect to actions alleging 
state law claims.  See id. at 650 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“It seems to me no more within our authority to declare the District Court’s 
views correct than it was within the Court of Appeals’ authority to reject them.  Either 
decision is an exercise of appellate review barred by the plain terms of § 1447(d).”). 
 208.  See Wunsch v. Am. Realty Capital Props., No. JFM-14-4007, 2015 WL 2183035, 
at *1, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48759, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 14, 2015) (“Section [16](c) is not 
relevant [to Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions] because the asserted claims do not 
arise under state law.”); Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (holding that no state court has competent jurisdiction over Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions); accord Lapin v. Facebook, Inc., Nos. C-12-3195 MMC et al., 
2012 WL 3647409, at *3, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119924, at *22-23 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 
2012). 
ARTICLE 2 (LOWENTHAL & CHOE).DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/15  5:47 PM 
786 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
have no state law claims precluded by Section 16(b), are also not 
removable under Section 16(c).209  They could not agree on the answer.210 
 
 209.  The dictum in Kircher that “subsection [16](c) is understood to be restricted to 
precluded actions defined by subsection (b),” 547 U.S. at 643-44, is irrelevant if defendants 
expressly disclaim any reliance on Section 16(c) for removal and rely solely on SLUSA’s 
Jurisdictional Provision and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
 210.  Compare Plymouth Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Model N., Inc., No. 14-cv-04516-WHO, 
2015 WL 65110, at *3, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1104, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015) (“The 
[Supreme] Court stated [in Kircher] that ‘authorization for removal in [Section 16](c) . . . is 
confined to cases set forth in [section 16](b).”) (emphasis added, internal brackets omitted), 
Young v. Pac. Biosci. of Cal., Inc., No. 5:11-cv-05668 EJD, 2012 WL 851509, at *3-4, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33695, at *8-12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012) (“[T]he court interprets 
[Section 16](c) as the Supreme Court did in Kircher:  only those ‘covered class actions’ 
described in [Section 16](b) alleging omission or deception based upon state law are 
removable.”) (first emphasis added, second emphasis in original), W. Va. Laborers Trust 
Fund v. STEC, Inc., No. SACV 11-01171-JVS (MLGx), 2011 WL 6156945, at *3-5, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146846, at *8-14 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (“[B]ecause this case is not 
precluded under subsection (b), it is not removable under subsection (c).”) (emphasis 
added), W. Palm Beach Police Pension Fund v. Cardionet, Inc., No. 10cv711-L(NLS), 2011 
WL 1099815, at *2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30607, at *4-6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011) (citing 
Kircher to hold that “any suit removable under SLUSA’s removal provision, [section 16](c), 
is precluded under SLUSA’s preclusion provision, [section 16](b), and any suit not 
precluded is not removable” and therefore holding that Exclusively Federal Securities Class 
Actions are not removable under Section 16(c)) (emphasis added), Parker v. Nat’l City 
Corp., No. 1:08 NC 70012, 2009 WL 9152972, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132947, at 
*16 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2009) (“Since § [16](b) limits removal jurisdiction to class actions 
involving state law claims and Plaintiffs in the instant action have asserted only federal 
claims, the court finds that Kircher weighs in favor of finding that jurisdiction over this 
matter is lacking.”) (emphasis modified), Layne v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 2008 WL 
9476380, at *1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123896, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2008) (Layne I) 
(citing Kircher and “conclud[ing] that it must remand”), and Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., 
No. 1:06-CV-02391-JEC, 2007 WL 2729011, at *9-11, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at 
*28-34 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007) (citations omitted) (citing Kircher as a “tiebreaker” in 
holding that Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions are not “within the group of cases 
that [Sections 22](a) and [16](c) permit to be removed,” although noting that this result “just 
makes no sense”) (emphasis added), with Brady v. Kosmos, Nos. 3:12-CV-373-B, 3:12-cv-
0781-B, 2012 WL 6204247, at *1 & n.2, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176567, at *5-6 & n.2 
(N.D. Tex. July 10, 2012) (holding after Kircher that “the authorities finding that removal 
[of Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions] is proper” are more convincing and 
“consistent with Congress’s broad goal of making federal court the ‘exclusive venue’ for the 
bulk of securities class actions”) (internal quotation marks omitted), Northumberland Cnty. 
Ret. Sys. v. GMX Res., Inc. 810 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1286-87 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (holding that 
Kircher and legislative history establish that Section 16(c) allows removal of Exclusively 
Federal Securities Class Actions), and Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., Ltd., No. 06-CV-2964 
(ERK), 2007 WL 778485, at *4-5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17671, at *13-19 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 
13, 2007) (holding that Kircher establishes that Section 16(c) allows removal of Exclusively 
Federal Securities Class Actions).  Commentators as well split on the proper reading of 
Kircher regarding Section 16(c) removal of Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions.  
Compare Butts, supra note 8 (arguing that Kircher establishes that only class actions with 
precluded state law claims as set forth in Section 16(b) are removable under Section 16(c)), 
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Unfortunately, many courts continue to view SLUSA’s Jurisdictional 
Amendment only through the lens of the Removal Bar Amendment and 
Section 16(c), confusing and conflating these provisions even though they 
are separate and distinct.  One of the most recent of these cases begins to 
consider the Jurisdictional Amendment and its use of the phrase “except as 
provided in Section [16],” but then suddenly shifts and focuses on the 
Removal Bar Amendment and its use of the phrase “except as provided in 
Section [16](c),” without recognizing that it is referring to two different 
SLUSA amendments.211  But this decision is only the latest of a line of 
cases that conflate the Jurisdictional Amendment — SLUSA 
§ 101(a)(3)(A) — with the Removal Bar Amendment — SLUSA 
§ 101(a)(3)(B).212 
While courts have often assumed that the Jurisdictional Amendment 
and the Removal Bar Amendment are interrelated, there is nothing in the 
text of SLUSA linking these two amendments.  They were passed in two 
different and co-equal sections of SLUSA — Section 101(a)(3)(A) versus 
Section 101(a)(3)(B) — and both must be read as having some independent 
effect.213  Neither amendment cross-references the other.  Nor are the 
amendments linked through a common cross-reference to a third statutory 
provision.  The Removal Bar Amendment includes a cross-reference to 
Section 16, subsection (c), of the Securities Act.  The Jurisdictional 
Amendment does not — it cross-references Section 16 as a whole.  Under 
ordinary rules of statutory construction, “when the legislature uses certain 
language in one part of the statute and different language in another . . . 
 
with Snyder, supra note 8, at 683-93 (arguing that all covered class actions are removable 
under Section 16(c)).  None of these cases address whether, separate from Section 16(c), 
Exclusively Federal Securities Class Actions are removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
 211.  Desmarais v. Johnson, Nos. C 13-03666 WHA et al., 2013 WL 5735154, at *3, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153165, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2013) (emphasis added, internal 
brackets omitted). 
 212.  See Toth v. Envivo, Inc., No. C 12-5636 CW, 2013 WL 5596965, at *1, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 147569, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (citing the separate amendments 
effected by SLUSA § 101(a)(3)(A) and SLUSA § 101(a)(3)(B) without distinguishing 
them); Reyes v. Zynga, Inc., No. C 12-05065 JSW, 2013 WL 5529754, at *3, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 146465, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2013) (citing Section 22(a) generally 
without distinguishing between the Jurisdictional Provision and SLUSA § 101(a)(3)(A)’s 
amendment thereto, and the Removal Bar and SLUSA § 101(a)(3)(B)’s amendment 
thereto). 
 213.  See, e.g., Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 472 (1997) (“[L]egislative enactments 
should not be construed to render their provisions mere surplusage.”); Newby v. Enron 
Corp., 338 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding in the context of PSLRA amendments to 
federal securities laws that where “[s]ubsection (b), which is equal in rank to subsection (a), 
is separate and distinct from subsection (a),” the terms of one subsection should not be read 
onto the other). 
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different meanings were intended.”214  Section 16(c) may be central to the 
understanding of the Removal Bar Amendment, but it has no facial bearing 
on the interpretation of the Jurisdictional Amendment or the Securities 
Act’s Jurisdictional Provision.215 
CONCLUSION 
SLUSA’s Jurisdictional Amendment — Section 101(a)(3)(A) — 
clearly divests state court of jurisdiction over some category of actions.  
The most natural reading of the Jurisdictional Amendment’s text, as 
explained in Knox, is that this category consists of Exclusively Federal 
Securities Class Actions.  This reading is also consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Kircher, which establishes that the Jurisdictional 
Amendment does not divest state courts of jurisdiction over class actions 
asserting state law claims, and is the only reading that comports with the 
legislative history and purpose of SLUSA — that all securities class actions 
should be litigated in the federal courts — and the precepts of federalism. 
 
 
 214.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (quoting A. N. SINGER, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06, at 194 (6th rev. ed. 2000)). 
 215.  What, then, is the purpose of the Removal Bar Amendment?  The Removal Bar 
Amendment revises the Removal Bar, which applies only to cases that allege federal 
Securities Act claims, but the Removal Bar Amendment cross-references Section 16(c), 
which in turn cross-references Section 16(b), which addresses state law claims.  The actions 
affected by the Removal Bar Amendment must therefore be class actions that allege both 
federal Securities Act claims and state law claims.  The reason why the Removal Bar 
Amendment is necessary in addition to the Jurisdictional Amendment is this:  while the 
Jurisdictional Amendment can clearly divest state courts of jurisdiction over class actions 
alleging only federal Securities Act claims, see, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 758 
(2009), it is not clear that the Jurisdictional Amendment can fully divest state courts of 
jurisdiction over class actions alleging both federal and state law claims.  See supra Part IV.  
The Removal Bar Amendment “thus was needed to eliminate any doubt about the 
removability of cases that include both state law claims and . . . claims based on the 
Securities Act,” In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D.N.H. 2004) — even if 
state courts retain jurisdiction over such cases, they can be removed to federal court. 
